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DEATH AND PAPERWORK REDUCTION
ADAM M. SAMAHA†
ABSTRACT
How does government value people’s time? Often the valuation is
implicit, even mysterious. But in patches of the federal administrative
state, paperwork burdens are quantified in hours and often
monetized. When agencies do monetize, they look to how the labor
market values the time of the people faced with paperwork. The result
is that some people’s time is valued over ten times more than other
people’s time. In contrast, when agencies monetize the value of
statistical life for cost-benefit analysis, they look to how people faced
with a risk of death subjectively value its reduction. In practice,
agencies assign the same value to every statistical life saved by a given
policy.
This Article establishes these patterns of agency behavior and
suggests that there is no satisfying justification for them. Welfarist and
egalitarian principles, along with the logic of statistical life valuation,
lean against the use of market wages to monetize a person’s time
doing government paperwork. The impact of this practice might be
limited, given the modest ambition of today’s paperwork reduction
efforts. But time-related burdens—and benefits—are key
consequences of government decisions in countless contexts. If we
want to scale up a thoughtful process for valuing people’s time in the
future, we will need new foundations.
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INTRODUCTION
In an odd corner of the federal government at this moment, a
mid-level agency official is busy making educated guesses about how
much time a particular government initiative will cost. Not how much
money people will pay, but how much time they will spend, in units of
hours. Sometimes lots of hours. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
estimated that individual taxpayers would spend 1.9 billion hours
1
preparing their federal tax returns in 2015. The Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) reports that annual federal
2
paperwork burdens exceed 9.4 billion hours, all told, which amounts
to a full workweek of time for each adult in the United States if the
3
burden were spread evenly. In fact, as shown below, numerous
federal officials are now obligated to estimate how many hours of our
lives will be devoted to following the law or to showing that we
deserve the law’s entitlements, benefits, and exemptions.
1. See Proposed Collection; Comment Request for Form 1040, 79 Fed. Reg. 24,498, 24,499
tbls. 1–2 (Apr. 30, 2014).
2. OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
INFORMATION COLLECTION BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 3 (2014)
[hereinafter 2014 OIRA REPORT], http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/
icb/icb_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/SJP3-3ENL] (regarding FY2013).
3. About 39 hours: 9.4 billion hours for FY2013 divided by the estimated 2013 population
of people age 18 and over (76.7 percent of the total population of 316,128,839, or 242,470,820
adults). See State and County Quickfacts Beta Table, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.
census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html [http://perma.cc/M9QL-9GPC]; see also American Time Use
Survey—2013 Results, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
atus.nr0.htm [http://perma.cc/7DYL-Q4MG] (reporting that “[e]mployed persons worked an
average of 7.6 hours on the days they worked”).
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But government efforts at time quantification are neither
comprehensive nor uniform. These efforts occur only in segments of
the bureaucracy with respect to slices of policy effects. For instance,
paperwork associated with litigation is excluded from OIRA’s time
4
count, and time spent commuting or waiting around seems to be left
5
out as well. Moreover, quantification methods are not standardized
despite White House oversight. Sometimes agencies count hours
6
without converting those time burdens into dollar costs. When
agencies do translate hours into dollars, the monetized costs typically
depend on how the labor market values the time of those who will do
the paperwork and not on a universal figure for everyone. The
resulting variance is remarkable: by using hourly wages to value time
spent doing paperwork, some people’s time gets counted as over ten
7
times more valuable than other people’s time. New data, introduced
below, shows this. A society concerned with inequality should not
ignore it.
In some ways, death is different. Leading federal agencies make
well-known, routinized efforts to quantify the value of human life—
more precisely, the value people assign to reducing small risks of
death. This value comes in dollars, not hours. Indeed, Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) guidance for cost-benefit analysis
(CBA) has long recommended monetizing a value for the number of
8
statistical lives saved by proposed regulations. But this dollar value is
not based on hourly wages; and each agency assigns the same value to
each statistical life saved by a given risk-reducing policy. The global
number is now $9.2 million at the Department of Transportation, for
9
example. By converting the benefit of statistical lives saved into
4. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
5. For instances of an agency including commuting time in an information collection
request, see infra note 111.
6. See infra notes 116–19, Figure 1, Figure 2, and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 121–24, Figure 3, and accompanying text.
8. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO.
A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS 30 (2003) [hereinafter CIRCULAR NO. A-4], http://www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4 [http://perma.cc/B5A6-J533] (“A substantial majority of
the resulting estimates of [value of statistical life (VSL)] vary from roughly $1 million to $10
million per statistical life. . . . You should consider providing estimates of both VSL and [value
of a statistical life year], while recognizing the developing state of knowledge in this area.”).
9. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., GUIDANCE ON TREATMENT OF THE ECONOMIC VALUE
OF A STATISTICAL LIFE 1, 3 (2014), http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/VSL_Guidance
_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/72WT-RKA2] (noting a policy against estimating a different value of
statistical life (VSL) for subgroups, and stating that analysts should calculate high/low estimates
using $13.0/$5.2 million); James K. Hammitt & Lisa A. Robinson, The Income Elasticity of the
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dollars, officials can easily compare projected regulatory costs, which
usually come in dollars.
When officials estimate the number of hours expended without
converting those units of time into dollars, however, there is no
obvious way to integrate those time estimates into an overall
evaluation of the proposal. Of course it is possible to conclude that a
person’s dollars and time are incommensurable—and so too for life,
limbs, liberty, and other things. It is also possible to conclude that a
person’s dollars, time, life, and so on are all sufficiently
commensurable for purposes of policymaking, by converting each to
the same metric of value—dollars, happiness, or whatever. Our
government adopts neither of these positions. Instead, the
administrative state is basically determined to convert risks to
people’s lives, but not always losses of their time, into dollars; and
when government does convert our time into dollars, our wages are
used to produce large disparities in valuation.
In this Article, I establish these patterns and then suggest that
there is no satisfying reason for them. My point of departure is the
10
Paperwork Reduction Act, which surely has had an effect on federal
agency practice. Untold numbers of information collections are
prevented by the Act’s own paperwork demands, and we can hope
that many of these foregone collections were not worthwhile. In some
respects, however, the statute has been a miserable failure. The Act
offered tall talk and weird numerical benchmarks for reducing a
subset of all time-related burdens. Neither careful cost-benefit
11
analysis nor much scholarly attention followed. In fact, even if the

Value per Statistical Life: Transferring Estimates Between High and Low Income Populations, 2
J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 1, 6–7 (2011) (explaining that federal agencies do not use different
VSL for different subpopulations, but do adjust VSL over time based on real income changes
for the overall population). Agencies have not fully converged on their VSLs but there is a
bounded range. See ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC
ANALYSES B-1 to B-2 (2010) (recommending $7.4 million in 2006 dollars based on surveys and
wage-risk data); CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HOW AGENCIES MONETIZE
“STATISTICAL LIVES” EXPECTED TO BE SAVED BY REGULATIONS 10–17 (2010); Hammitt &
Robinson, supra, at 4 (“Most U.S. agencies use central values . . . between about $5 million and
$8 million when expressed in 2007 dollars.”). Agency reporting of the value of a statistical life
year (VSLY) and quality-adjusted life years (QALY) complicates matters, but begins to link
lives saved to time lost. See infra Part III.A.
10. Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521 (2012 & Supp. I 2014).
11. What passes as the academically alluring part of the Act involves OIRA and its role in
cost-benefit analysis (CBA), which is directed by executive orders. See 44 U.S.C. § 3503(a)
(2012) (establishing OIRA within OMB); Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 6(b), 3 C.F.R. 215, 217
(2012) (regarding CBA); Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 646–48 (1994) (same);
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Act’s fight-paperwork-with-paperwork strategy is effective, the very
mission of paperwork reduction might look passé. We live in a digital
world of big-data analytics, crowdsourcing, and high-tech
surveillance—new tools for information collection beyond old school
routines of bureaucrats posing one-way questions on photocopied
12
forms.
So the Act might be a failure, but it is a provocative failure. It
implicates foundational questions for government, which needs
reliable information to function well and yet must value people’s time
appropriately to deserve their respect. Understanding the Act’s
shortfalls can inspire us to better measure and evaluate time-related
burdens in a wider range of settings, or at least to wonder whether,
why, where, and how government cares about our time.
Part I examines the law of federal paperwork, explaining the
structure and standards for approving information collection requests.
Part II investigates agency practices and presents data on how
agencies actually quantify individual time burdens. Part III is
normative. It links the goals of saving lives and saving time, and
suggests that monetizing people’s time using wage rates is
unattractive from social welfarist and egalitarian perspectives. There
is room for disagreement over the best way forward, the notion of
13
civic duty will come into play for some burdens, and time burdens
14
faced by organizations are special. But today’s practices should draw
few cheers. Time-related burdens—and benefits—are key

cf. Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1840 nn.1–2 (2013) (noting scholarship on CBA but generalizing that
OIRA is an “information aggregator”).
On the Act generally, see William F. Funk, The Paperwork Reduction Act: Paperwork
Reduction Meets Administrative Law, 24 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1 (1987) (offering background from
the 1940s to the 1980s); Andrew L. Levy, The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980: Unnecessary
Burdens and Unrealized Efficiency, 14 J.L. & COM. 99, 113, 115–20 (1994) (complaining that
agencies violate the Act and recommending assertive judicial review); Jeffrey S. Lubbers,
Paperwork Redux: The (Stronger) Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 111
(1997) (explaining the new statute). On the situation in Europe, see Jonathan B. Wiener, Better
Regulation in Europe, 59 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 447, 447–49, 498–501 (2006). An ambitious
effort to think about administrative burdens within ordinary households is Elizabeth F. Emens,
Admin, 103 GEO. L.J. 1409, 1464 (2015).
12. On the transition away from direct questions, see Adam M. Samaha & Lior J.
Strahilevitz, Don’t Ask, Must Tell—And Other Combinations, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 919, 922,
975–80 (2015). The Paperwork Reduction Act and OIRA do encourage electronic filings and
dissemination, by the way. See infra notes 24 & 48.
13. See infra Part III.B.1.c.
14. See infra notes 232–35 and accompanying text.
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consequences of government policies in countless contexts. If we want
to scale up a thoughtful process for valuing people’s time in the
future, we will need new foundations.
I. PAPERWORK LAW
Modern government, like any institution, requires information.
Data is a cause and a product of institutional capacity. Hence
government officials ask questions or otherwise collect data to
enforce legal norms that people would otherwise ignore, to allocate
benefits that people desperately need, and to confirm eligibility for
regulatory exemptions that people deserve. But of course these
efforts cost somebody something. Resistance to bureaucratic “red
tape” and “wasted time” accompany government’s informationcollection efforts. The New Deal illustrated the conflict. Fighting a
global depression and a world war triggered major increases in
15
federal information collection, not just regulation and conscription.
Those increases were followed by administrative and legislative
initiatives to moderate the burden and target the government’s
16
collection efforts. The federal government’s “appetite for data” was
17
never “insatiable,” as the Supreme Court once suggested, but
information collection does cost us. An effort to regulate government
data collections, and make them sensitive to those costs, is entirely
18
logical.
15. See Funk, supra note 11, at 7–8 (discussing the backdrop against which action was
taken).
16. For more history, see U.S. COMM’N ON FED. PAPERWORK, HISTORY OF PAPERWORK
REFORM EFFORTS 1, 11–16, 24–25 (1977); Funk, supra note 11, at 7–70; Anne Marie Lyons, A
Social History of Paperwork Reform Efforts 11–13 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the author).
17. Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 32 (1990) (adding “seemingly” to
“insatiable”).
18. See Michael Lipsky, The Rationing of Services in Street-Level Bureaucracies, in
CRITICAL STUDIES IN ORGANIZATION AND BUREAUCRACY 264, 266 (Frank Fischer & Carmen
Sirianni eds., 1984) (“Clients [of government services] are typically required to wait for services;
it is a sign of their dependence and relative powerlessness that the costs of matching services
with the served are borne almost entirely by clients . . . . Importantly, bureaucracies often have
little interest in reducing delay, since more expeditious processing would simply strain available
resources.”); see also Mark N. Wexler, Re-thinking Queue Culture, 35 INT’L J. SOC’Y & SOC.
POL’Y 165, 168–71 (2015) (describing an emerging sociological perspective from which waiting
experiences are the product of third-party management and design, and less of spontaneous
norms generated by those waiting). The ability of clients, customers, and regulated parties to
exit may increase an organization’s sensitivity to time burdens on those populations. See
generally Sin-Hoon Hum & Hoon-Hong Sim, Time-Based Competition: Literature Review and
Implications for Modelling, 16 INT’L J. OPERATIONS & PRODUCTION MGMT. 75, 75 (1994)
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The Paperwork Reduction Act as we know it was built from
several bills with punchy titles, along with the less conspicuous
19
Federal Reports Act of 1942. There was the Paperwork Reduction
20
Act of 1980, followed by the Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization
21
22
Act of 1986, and the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. These
legislative efforts were not enough to win the war on government
paperwork. Others followed, including the Economic Growth and
23
Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996, the too-good-to-be24
true Government Paperwork Elimination Act of 1998, and the Small
25
Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002. Congress is not alone in the
effort. For his part, President Obama has tried to instigate and
26
publicize agency efforts to make major paperwork cuts. Recently the
President ordered each agency that imposes relatively high
paperwork burdens to identify initiatives that will reduce at least two
27
million hours of annual burden. Such missions must seem attractive
to mainstream voters if not to every interest group. The extent to
which the statutes and directives make a difference in government
operations is another question, the answer to which partly depends on
the structure and standards within today’s version of the Act.

(asserting customer sophistication and sensitivity to speed-related options across market
competitors). For an indication of slow yet significant improvement in paperwork processing by
competitors, see the case studies on administrative bottlenecks in Joseph D. Blackburn, TimeBased Competition: White-Collar Activities, 34 BUS. HORIZONS, no. 4, 1992, at 96, 96–101.
19. Federal Reports Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-841, 56 Stat. 1078.
20. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812.
21. Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 3341335 to -340 (Title VIII, sections 801–820 of the Continuing Appropriations Resolution).
22. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (rewriting 44
U.S.C. §§ 3501–3520).
23. Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S. Code).
24. Government Paperwork Elimination Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1701–1710,
112 Stat. 2681, 2749–51 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3504 (2012)) (involving electronic submissions).
25. Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-198, 116 Stat. 729
(codified in scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.).
26. See 2014 OIRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 15–18; Exec. Order No. 13,610 § 3, 77 Fed.
Reg. 28,469, 28,470 (May 10, 2012) (ordering agencies to prioritize “initiatives that will produce
significant quantifiable monetary savings or significant quantifiable reductions in paperwork
burdens” (emphasis added)).
27. See 2014 OIRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 16 n.22 (citing Memorandum of Cass R.
Sunstein, Admin., OIRA, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (June 22, 2012)).
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A. Structure
The Paperwork Reduction Act generates paperwork, actually.
The Act mandates bureaucratic sensitivity to paperwork burdens by
28
creating a bureaucracy that does paperwork on paperwork. Federal
agencies must hire Chief Information Officers and underlings who
will implement procedures to regulate agency information collections
29
directed at ten or more persons. Regulated “collections” include not
only information sent to the federal government (e.g., tax forms and
benefits applications), but also recordkeeping by private parties (e.g.,
workplace accident reports) and disclosures between private parties
30
(e.g., food labeling). Agency collections are regulated “whether such
collection of information is mandatory, voluntary, or required to
31
obtain or retain a benefit.”
In other ways, however, the statute is notably narrow. Targeted
federal investigations and civil and criminal litigation are explicitly
32
carved out of the Act’s concern, even though these burdens can be
extremely heavy for the persons involved. In addition, a variety of
time-related consequences are apparently beyond the Act’s
requirements. True, the statute is written to make agencies sensitive
to resources expended reviewing instructions, searching for data,
33
completing and reviewing forms, and transmitting information. But
these activities do not necessarily include other time-related burdens,
such as learning about regulations, traveling to a government office if
necessary, waiting in line, and other items within a broad
28. A few federal agencies are exempt from the structure described here. See 44 U.S.C.
§ 3502(1) (2012) (excluding the Federal Election Commission, the Government Accounting
Office, the D.C. government, territorial governments, and “[g]overnment-owned contractoroperated facilities, including laboratories engaged in national defense research and production
activities”); Kuzma v. U.S. Postal Serv., 798 F.2d 29, 32 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the U.S.
Postal Service, as opposed to the Postal Rate Commission, is exempt from the Act).
29. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3502(3)(A)(i), 3506(a)(2)–(3) (2012).
30. See id. § 3502(3)(A) (defining “collection of information” as “the obtaining, causing to
be obtained, soliciting, or requiring the disclosure to third parties or the public, of facts or
opinions by or for an agency, regardless of form or format”); Action All. of Senior Citizens v.
Sullivan, 930 F.2d 77, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (including grant recipients’ required self-evaluations
regarding Age Discrimination in Employment Act compliance within the OMB review process,
even though this paperwork would not necessarily be sent to the federal government).
31. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(c) (2014); see also infra notes 191–93 and accompanying text
(discussing the usefulness of estimating time burdens that are thought to be associated with
conditions on government benefits).
32. 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3)(B) (2012) (referencing § 3518(c)(1)–(2) and recognizing that most
“general investigations” are not covered by the Act).
33. See id. § 3502(2)(A)–(F).
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34

understanding of “compliance costs.” An agency might have the will
and authority to investigate these other time burdens—OMB
35
guidance for cost-benefit analysis is nicely inclusive on this score —
but the Act does not explicitly regulate them.
When the Act does cover an agency collection, however, it
36
triggers a formidable-looking screening procedure. The process
ordinarily takes months. First, an information collection request
37
typically will be subject to public notice and comment. If the agency
wants to go forward, the proposal must be reviewed and approved by
OIRA in a clearance process. Someone at the agency completes an
38
39
OMB form, writes a supporting statement, and assembles
supporting documents, and then someone at OIRA reviews the
40
agency’s paperwork. This clearance process is accompanied by a
second round of public notice and comment, along with an
41
opportunity for individual challenges directed at OMB.
Moreover, OMB cannot authorize a collection for longer than
42
three years. These automatic sunsets are then followed by further

34. Some of these uncovered activities allow for multitasking, which is a complication I
leave aside for now. Cf. Robert A. Pollak, Notes on Time Use, MONTHLY LABOR REV., Aug.
1999, at 7, 8 (describing “simultaneous activities,” divided into “parallel” activities like driving
while listening to the radio and “on call” situations like cooking while being responsible for a
sleeping child). Also note privacy concerns as a cost, which are covered by other laws.
35. See infra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing CBA guidance). IRS’s 2011
survey on taxpayer burdens mentioned “researching tax law changes” in the instructions, and
the survey form listed “[r]esearching strategies to reduce the taxes you owe” and “[g]athering
IRS tax forms, instructions, or publications.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF
TREASURY, INDIVIDUAL TAXPAYER BURDEN SURVEY, at i, 12 (2011), http://www.reginfo.gov/
public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=25585501 [http://perma.cc/LJ86-GSUN].
36. See generally 44 U.S.C. § 3507(a)(1)(D), (a)(2)–(3), (b)–(c) (2012) (covering Paperwork
Reduction Act standards and procedural requirements); id. § 3508 (same); 5 C.F.R. § 1320.10
(2014) (reiterating and elaborating on same).
37. See 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(2)(A) (2012).
38. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PAPERWORK
REDUCTION ACT SUBMISSION (OMB FORM 83-I) 1 (2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/inforeg/83i-fill.pdf [http://perma.cc/S6AK-2Z4F].
39. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PAPERWORK
REDUCTION ACT SUBMISSIONS (SUPPORTING STATEMENT INSTRUCTIONS) 6–7 (1995)
[hereinafter OMB SUPPORTING STATEMENT INSTRUCTIONS], http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/inforeg/83i-fill.pdf [http://perma.cc/FG8X-A94B].
40. See Lubbers, supra note 11, at 115. The Act refers to OMB but OIRA does the job in
practice.
41. See 44 U.S.C. § 3517(b) (2012). An independent regulatory agency, see id. § 3502(5)
(defining the term with a list and a residual clause), may reverse an OMB disapproval of a
proposed collection if the agency gives reasons. See id. § 3507(f); 5 C.F.R. § 1320.15 (2014).
42. See 44 U.S.C. § 3507(g) (2012).
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rounds of request, notice, comment, and review for information
43
collections that still matter to agencies. There is a different
procedure when an information collection is bundled with a proposed
44
regulation, in which OIRA participates in the comment process. But
those collections are likewise subject to automatic sunset and then
stand-alone requests to OIRA. In addition, agencies must advertise
45
estimated burdens to those who suffer them, and OIRA reports
annually to Congress on agency progress in reducing the public
46
burden of information collection.
To be sure, all of this procedure might be completed without
much hardship. The latest IRS proposal for individual income tax
forms drew a grand total of zero public comments after notice in the
47
Federal Register. Moreover, agencies may now use a menu-driven
48
website to submit information collection requests to OIRA. If OMB
fails to act within sixty days, approval may be inferred and the agency
49
may go ahead and collect the information for a year. OMB offers
50
expedited review in emergencies. Courts are largely absent from the
51
process, so the expected litigation burden is modest. And OMB may

43. See Lewis v. Comm’r, 523 F.3d 1272, 1276 n.8 (10th Cir. 2008) (discussing IRS Form
1040).
44. See 5 C.F.R. § 1320.11 (2014) (clarifying OMB’s role in filing public comments); see also
44 U.S.C. §§ 3506(c)(2)(B), 3507(d)(4)(C) (2012) (allowing OMB to reject “unreasonable”
agency rejections of OMB comments).
45. See 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1)(B)(iii)(III) (2012); see also id. § 3506(c)(1)(B)(iii)(I)
(requiring stated reasons).
46. See id. § 3514(a)(2)(A).
47. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN: SUPPORTING
STATEMENT 21 (2014), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=4713
0100 [http://perma.cc/YH6Y-CLSP].
48. The new “ROCIS” platform replaced a mainframe in 2006, and it offers the older data
plus several new search options and easy public access to agency supporting documents. See
Information Collection Review Data on Reginfo.gov, REGINFO.GOV, http://www.reginfo.gov/
public/jsp/PRA/ICR_info.jsp [http://perma.cc/L54U-Z8XL] (indicating that the old data system
has records back to the 1970s, but that supporting data for agency requests was not saved in the
system until 1995). The manual for the information collection review module is 123 pages long.
See REGULATORY INFO. SERV. CTR., ROCIS HOW TO GUIDE FOR AGENCY USERS OF THE
INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST (ICR) MODULE (2013) [hereinafter ROCIS HOW TO
GUIDE], https://www.rocis.gov/rocis/jsp3/common/ROCIS_HOW_TO_Guide_for_AGENCY_
Users_of_ICR_Module-08272013.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZQU7-NN2Y].
49. See 44 U.S.C. § 3507(c)(3) (2012).
50. See 5 C.F.R. § 1320.13 (2014).
51. Courts might not be willing to bar judicial review of OMB approvals of stand-alone
information collection requests as matters committed to agency discretion, see 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(2) (2012); Levy, supra note 11, at 118, but courts have played no direct role in defining
burdens, assessing benefits, or evaluating agency need for information collections. The statute
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delegate its review authority to trusted officials, such as the Federal
Reserve’s Board of Governors and the Federal Communication
52
Commission’s Managing Director.
Still, every lawful information request comes with a stack of
(electronic) paper, and therefore the trade-offs associated with added
53
process. To the extent the Act has an independent effect on agencies
that are sensitive to procedural costs, we can expect the statute’s
procedures to reduce the number of information collections, to
increase the government cost of performing the surviving collections,
and, hopefully, to increase the quality of those collections by
enhancing deliberation and participation by people from multiple
54
perspectives. But we can wonder exactly which collections survive
and which are screened out by the process. Other statutory provisions
are merely suggestive on those questions, as we shall see.
B. Standards
The Act does call on agencies to pay attention to burdens. Each
agency must operate an internal process that yields “a specific,
objectively supported estimate of burden” for each information
55
collection. And each agency is supposed to certify that each
collection “reduces to the extent practicable and appropriate the
burden on persons who shall provide information to or for the
56
57
agency.” As the entity with global oversight authority, OMB is

does provide a defense to penalties for failing to comply with an agency information request
that unlawfully omits a valid OMB control number. See 44 U.S.C. § 3512 (2012); 5 C.F.R.
§ 1320.6 (2014) (covering, as well, agency failure to inform respondents that they are not
required to respond absent such a display, with an exception for the tax code, 26 U.S.C.
§ 6011(a)); United States v. Hatch, 919 F.2d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990) (confirming this defense
in a criminal case). But courts have denied that the Act offers a private right of action. See, e.g.,
Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 844 (9th Cir. 1999). In any event,
complaining and commenting, let alone litigating, are not worth it for most people.
52. See 44 U.S.C. § 3507(i) (2012); 5 C.F.R. §§ 1320.16(d), 1320 app. A (2014).
53. See Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601, 616–20 (2006) (discussing
decision costs, error rates, and so on).
54. Who gains and who loses is not entirely clear. The Act might shift information
collection burdens from the private sector to the federal government—then back to the private
sector, depending on who pays for these government operations. This prospect of cost shifting
should prompt the question whether we might go further, and “in-source” within government
more information collection and dissemination duties.
55. 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1)(A)(iv) (2012).
56. Id. § 3506(c)(3)(C); cf. id. § 3506(c)(3)(A), (J) (requiring an agency to certify that a
collection submitted for review, inter alia, “is necessary for the proper performance of the
functions of the agency, including that the information has practical utility,” and “to the
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supposed to set and oversee standards for estimating collection
58
burdens, and also “minimize the [f]ederal information collection
burden, with particular emphasis on those individuals and entities
59
most adversely affected.” The Act directs attention at the benefits of
information, too. Agencies are supposed to evaluate the “need” for
60
the information, and OMB shall “maximize the practical utility of
61
and public benefit from information collected.” Thus the statute
makes room for, if not requires, a cost-benefit protocol for
information demands—language such as “to the extent practicable
62
and appropriate” and “practical utility” suggests as much.
In addition, the Act is, or was, weirdly precise about how much
burden reduction should happen. The 1995 legislation contained
percentage goals, albeit of unknown origin. The statute instructed
OMB to consult with agency heads and “set an annual
[g]overnmentwide goal for the reduction of information collection
burdens by at least 10 percent during each of fiscal years 1996 and
1997 and 5 percent during each of fiscal years 1998, 1999, 2000, and

maximum extent practicable, uses information technology to reduce burden and improve data
quality, agency efficiency and responsiveness to the public”).
57. See id. § 3504(c)(1) (stating that the OMB Director shall review and approve proposed
collections).
58. See id. § 3504(c)(5).
59. Id. § 3504(c)(3).
60. See id. § 3506(c)(1)(A)(i); see also id. § 3508 (“Before approving a proposed collection
of information, the [OMB] Director shall determine whether the collection . . . is
necessary . . . .”).
61. Id. § 3504(c)(4); see also id. § 3508 (similar). Left unspecified is “public benefit” for
OMB purposes in Section 3504(c)(4), and “practical utility” is unhelpfully defined as “the ability
of an agency to use information, particularly the capability to process such information in a
timely and useful fashion.” Id. § 3502(11).
62. The best interpretation is not doubt-free. The Act’s directive that OMB “minimize” the
paperwork burden is not the clearest way to endorse CBA, for instance. But an agency decision
to conduct CBA probably is a reasonable interpretive choice. See Entergy Corp v. Riverkeeper,
Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 217–19 (2009) (allowing EPA to use CBA under a statute requiring “best
technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact”). “Minimize” must not
mean “eliminate at all costs,” which would be satisfied by collecting no information beyond that
required by other law. Even OMB’s directive to make collections the “least burdensome
necessary,” 5 C.F.R. § 1320.5(d)(1)(i) (2014), is linked to agency functions and program
objectives, see id., which seem to be benefits. And of course “necessary” sometimes means
useful or convenient instead of indispensable. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston &
Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 419 (1992) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
413 (1819)); Necessary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). Related debates over CBA
and feasibility analysis are discussed in Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility
Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 665–70 (2010).
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2001.” OIRA has reported that, almost without exception, the
64
federal government failed to meet these numerical goals. But before
allocating blame, we should recognize that OIRA’s confession
depends on a choice of metrics, and this choice is not dictated by the
statute.
The Act is remarkably open about how to count paperwork
burdens. The statute defines “burden” as “time, effort, or financial
resources expended by persons to generate, maintain, or provide
65
information to or for a [f]ederal agency.” So when agencies try to
estimate the “burden” of an information collection objectively, it is
not fully clear what they are supposed to be objective about. And
when agencies and OMB try to appropriately minimize information
collection “burden,” it is not fully clear what is supposed to be
minimized, let alone who counts as “most adversely affected” and the
extent to which the utility of the collection may justify its burdens.
Nor does the statute describe whether and how to convert estimated
burdens of time, effort, and money into the same metric. Similar
uncertainties surround OMB’s rule that each agency show that “it has
taken every reasonable step to ensure that the proposed collection of
information . . . is the least burdensome necessary for the proper
performance of the agency’s functions to comply with legal
66
requirements and achieve program objectives.” Least burdensome
on which metric?
The simplest interpretation appears to be that OMB and the
agencies choose metrics: they should somehow estimate and minimize
time, effort, or financial resources; and while they must strive to be
objective in their estimates, the statute seems not to make particular
choices of how to quantify these burden types. A reading like this
would follow the ordinary distinction between the disjunctive “or”
67
and the conjunctive “and.” Moreover, it would make space for
63. See 44 U.S.C. § 3505(a)(1) (2012); cf. Wiener, supra note 11, at 500–01 (reporting
percentage targets in the European Union that seem no better grounded). The conference
report to this Act suggests that the baseline for each goal was the preceding fiscal year, see H.R.
Conf. Rep. 104-99, at 32 (1995), but the report is uninformative about the proper metric(s) for
burden.
64. See OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
MANAGING INFORMATION COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION: FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 1 (2002).
65. 44 U.S.C. § 3502(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
66. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.5(d)(1)(i) (2014).
67. See, e.g., Chao v. Day, 436 F.3d 234, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting 1A NORMAN J.
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 21.14 (6th ed. 2002) (“[C]ourts
presume that ‘or’ is used in a statute disjunctively unless there is a clear legislative intent to the
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targeted judgments on suitable measurement within the jumble of
information collection efforts—from the census and customer
satisfaction surveys to blood tests and tax forms—but also unifying
judgments that allow the use of comparable metrics for collection
burdens and benefits. Not every information collection presents the
same estimation issues, as the statute’s ecumenical language seems to
recognize, and yet the statute channels agency requests into a central
oversight body with a mission of reducing burdens while enhancing
68
utility. This set up is unlike, say, the Inspector General Act, which
lacks an executive coordinator for the agency-level struggle against
69
waste, fraud, and abuse. OMB is statutorily tasked with making
paperwork assessments government-wide. A credible effort to
improve information collection globally needs flexibility as well as
universal metrics of some kind. The statute itself presents no test for
making such concrete choices, and instead lists nearly a dozen rival
70
purposes.
An alternative reading would understand “or” differently and
would require that all three kinds of burden be estimated and
71
minimized. Perhaps the Act’s definitional provision, in context, is
best interpreted such that a paperwork “burden” can be any of these
things and none should ever be ignored. As the 1980 Act was being
drafted, President Carter regulated agency information collections by

contrary.”)); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 116, 122–23 (2012)
(following similar reasoning and making room for contextual judgments).
68. Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. 3 §§ 1–13 (2012).
69. See Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 527 U.S. 229,
240 (1999) (setting aside the President and agency heads, and explaining that “[t]here is no
‘OIG–OIG’”).
70. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501(1)–(11) (2012) (reciting various purposes including lower costs
and higher benefits from information collections); cf. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, H.R.
Rep. No. 104-37, at 22–23 (1995) (quoting an interest group’s conversion of hours to dollars, but
remaining unclear on how burden-reduction goals should be tallied). I am not discussing these
interpretive issues in terms of Chevron deference, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
229–31 (2001) (discussing eligibility for Chevron deference), because courts are out of the
picture. See supra note 51. If need be, there is a good case for judicial deference to (reasonable)
OMB/OIRA decisions to choose one or another metric for burdens. The Paperwork Reduction
Act charges OMB with establishing and overseeing “standards and guidelines by which agencies
are to estimate the burden to comply with a proposed collection of information.” 44 U.S.C.
§ 3504(c)(5) (2012). Even without formal promulgation of metrics under that provision, agencies
have responsibility to administer processes for evaluating and moderating paperwork burdens
under the statute, see id. § 3506(c)(1)(A)(iv), as overseen by OIRA.
71. See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 573 (1956) (“[T]he word ‘or’ is often used as a
careless substitute for the word ‘and.’”).
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executive order; the OMB-review component of this initiative focused
72
on hours, not dollars or anything else. We might understand the Act
by contrast to that limited notion of burden. However, a broad
concept of burden does not cut sharply between conjunctive and
disjunctive interpretations of the statute’s definitional provision, nor
does it indicate how much discretion officials should have.
Furthermore, it is not obvious how officials could minimize
respondent time, money, and effort all at once. These metrics can
point in different directions. For instance, simplifying government
forms can prompt individuals to substitute do-it-yourself (DIY)
solutions in place of contracting out the paperwork, thereby
increasing respondent burden hours while decreasing their out-of73
pocket expenditures.
74
OMB might have tried to resolve these issues by regulation, but
it has not. OMB rules from 1995 define burden in nearly the same
75
language as the statute, followed by a more detailed list of included
activities: burden means “total time, effort, or financial resources”
from activities such as reviewing instructions, searching data sources,
76
training personnel, and using technology to collect information. The
rules do not instruct when burdens should be measured or minimized
in time, money, or anything else. Protocols for showing agency need,
estimating the utility of information, and comparing these to the
burdens of collection are at least equally undefined. Formal law
72. Although President Carter’s order directed agencies to minimize the paperwork
burden on people outside the federal government in terms of “the time and costs entailed,” he
ordered agencies to prepare annual paperwork budgets based on “an estimate of the total
number of hours required to comply with requests for information.” Exec. Order No. 12,174,
§§ 1-101, 1-104, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,609, 69,609 (Nov. 30, 1979) (ordering the Director of the OMB
to review proposed agency paperwork budgets and subsequent requests for increases); see also
Controlling Paperwork Burdens on the Public, 45 Fed. Reg. 2586, 2594 (Jan. 11, 1980)
(proposing, in § 1320.41(i), to define burden solely in terms of time).
73. Cf. Stanley Veliotis, Sweating the Small Stuff: The Cost of Immaterial Tax Law
Provisions, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 36, 54–55 (2011) (suggesting that tax code complexity
helps explain increased use of paid tax preparers and tax software).
74. See 44 U.S.C. § 3504(c)(5) (2012) (regarding the OMB’s duty to set standards and
guidelines for burden estimates); id. § 3516 (granting the Director rulemaking authority).
75. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(b)(1) (2014) (“[T]he total time, effort, or financial resources
expended by persons to generate, maintain, retain, or disclose or provide information to or for a
Federal agency.” (emphases added)); see Controlling Paperwork Burdens on the Public, 60 Fed.
Reg. 44,978, 44,985 (Aug. 29, 1995) (including this definition).
76. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(b)(1)(i)–(ii), (vi), (vii) (2014) (emphasis added); see also id.
§ 1320.3(b)(2)–(3) (explaining that the burden estimate should exclude burdens undertaken in
the ordinary course of business and those that the agency can show would be required by state,
local, or tribal governments anyway).
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certainly does present agencies with procedural cost whenever they
ponder an information collection, but provides no algorithm for
evaluating those collections. Agency evaluation is importantly
decentralized.
II. PAPERWORK PRACTICES
Indications of agency and OIRA routines are other sources of
understanding, but the patterns are not ready-made. A jump into the
trenches of the federal paperwork process shows that different
agencies have different practices for quantifying information
collection burdens. OIRA oversight is not rigid enough to produce
uniform standards even in the field of burden quantification, to say
nothing of need, benefits, and ultimate determinations of whether
and how to collect information. For now, we can try to understand
better how agencies evaluate burdens. What follows is a discussion of
interesting examples, some suggested patterns and aggregate data,
plus an initial search for positive explanations—which seem neither
simple nor self-evident.
A. Agencies
On significant occasions, agencies estimate burdens in hours and
without dollar conversions. Consider the constitutionally mandated
77
decennial census. For 2010, the Census Bureau estimated that U.S.
households would need about 24 million hours—and zero dollars—to
78
complete census forms at five or ten minutes a piece. The Bureau
explained that “[t]here is no cost to respondents, except for the time
79
it takes to respond to the questions.” (The cost of collection to the
80
federal government was estimated in dollars: about $8.5 billion. ) It is
true, of course, that people do not pay out-of-pocket to fill out this
fairly brief survey, with answers often immediately known to the
respondent. But we may still ask why an agency would not convert its
time estimate into a dollar estimate, and the Bureau offered no
answer to that question. True, census surveys are not large time

77. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring an “actual Enumeration” but in some legally
directed “Manner”).
78. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 CENSUS: SUPPORTING STATEMENT PART A REVISED
25–26 tbl.1 (2008), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=18128501
[http://perma.cc/2A59-LHUW].
79. Id. at 26.
80. See id. at 27.
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burdens for each one of us individually, and we get ten years off
between them. Many respondents might think that filling out census
forms is a little bit fun, or at least a fulfilling civic duty that yields
interesting information about life in the United States. Perhaps we
should shrug off the census example as a low-stakes issue with
understandably restrained agency effort to quantify burdens.
Tax forms are orders of magnitude more significant than the
81
census in terms of respondent burden, and yet agency quantification
practices are similar. For the millions of households legally obliged to
file a tax return, the burden probably is the largest they undertake for
the federal government. IRS predicts for various classes of taxpayers
how much time they will spend filling out an individual tax return,
such as a Form 1040-EZ or 1040 with Schedules. This estimate is in
82
hours, ranging from four to twenty-four. In addition, IRS estimates
average out-of-pocket costs—pegged at $207 per taxpayer and $31.7
billion in total for tax year 2014. But IRS explains that those dollar
figures are separate economic expenditures on top of the estimated
83
cost in hours. It makes sense to count up dollar costs to hire a tax
preparer along with time costs that an individual needs to prepare
their own tax forms, whether the taxpayer is reporting income as
required by law or seeking deductions that are legally optional. Good
84
policymaking depends on all of this information. The question,
again, is why IRS would estimate time costs without converting those
costs into dollar figures, and again the agency offered no answer. Not
converting time to dollars is an especially remarkable omission in this
context, where people are aware of a vibrant market for tax
preparation. Low stakes and taxpayer enjoyment are not good
explanations for the absence of a dollar conversion.
What about a pattern related to civic duty? People will disagree
about the precise scope of our civic duties, properly understood, but
perhaps agencies refuse to monetize hours spent on tasks that are
81. See 2014 OIRA REPORT, supra note 2, at iii (estimating that Treasury accounted for 75
percent of total hours tallied).
82. See Proposed Collection; Comment Request for Form 1040, 79 Fed. Reg. 24,498, 24,499
Exs. 1–2 (Apr. 30, 2014). Some individual filers are “business filers,” and the estimated time
burden is higher for the latter.
83. See id. at 24,498–99 (“Time spent and out-of-pocket costs are presented
separately. . . . Out-of-pocket costs include . . . tax return preparation and submission fees,
postage and photocopying costs, and tax preparation software costs.”). Presumably IRS reduces
the estimated time burden for those who hire a tax preparer.
84. On the usefulness of tallying time “burdens” that arise as conditions for receiving a
government “benefit” of some kind, see infra notes 191–93 and accompanying text.
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easily associated with legal or societal obligations of good citizenship.
Military draft registration shows up on the list of nonmonetized
85
paperwork burdens, as it happens, which might sit comfortably
86
alongside census forms and tax returns as civic duties. This potential
pattern is unsettled with additional study, however. One complication
is that, as administered, the decennial census collects more data than
87
necessary to make a constitutionally required actual enumeration.
This should make us wonder whether census responses go beyond the
best notion of civic duty, even if Congress is entirely free under the
law to pose these questions. Paperwork needed to claim various tax
deductions, such as for home mortgage interest, also presents
difficulties for a public duty characterization even if allowing such
deductions is good public policy. Any civic duty pattern is upset
further once we scan a wider range of paperwork burdens tracked by
the administrative state. In the following discussion we will see that
many applications for government benefits do not prompt agency
monetization (Social Security Administration paperwork, for
instance, in curious contrast to Veterans Administration paperwork,
88
which is monetized), while mandatory reporting requirements for
regulated industries are typically monetized (the Environmental
89
Protection Agency’s Acid Rain Program, for instance). Either the
notion of civic duty at work is irreducibly mysterious, or civic duty
does little or no work in monetization decisions.
Searching further, reporting hours without dollars surely is not
the most common agency practice but it happens in smatterings of
significant places. Examples from established programs include the
Department of Education’s online Free Application for Federal
Student Aid—which, according to the agency, is free in dollar terms
85. See U.S. SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., SELECTIVE SERVICE REGISTRATION FORM:
SUPPORTING STATEMENT 3–4 (2011), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?
objectID=31028501 [http://perma.cc/FE3W-KLDR] (not monetizing time to complete selective
service forms).
86. For more on civic duty, see infra Part III.B.1.c.
87. See The Questions on the Form, U.S. CENSUS 2010, http://www.census.gov/2010census/
text/text-form.php [http://perma.cc/E364-CSCH] (listing and explaining the questions on the
2010 standard form, including questions about age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin for purposes
of funding programs, monitoring antidiscrimination law compliance, and academic research);
see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: SUPPORTING
STATEMENT 16–17 (2013), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=
41990401 [http://perma.cc/N3JH-P7CU] (not monetizing time to complete annual census
surveys voluntarily answered by samples of households).
88. See infra Figure 2.
89. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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and burdensome only in hours (26 million hours, that is). Similarly,
application burdens for people seeking disability benefits from the
91
Social Security Administration are totaled in hours, not dollars. The
burden on medical professionals who evaluate applicant disability is
92
likewise left in hours. The foregoing examples could indicate an
older view about how to count paperwork burdens, locked into
renewal requests by past practice. But several recent agency requests
also use hours without conversion to dollars, including new
93
collections in which the estimated burden exceeds one million hours.

90. See OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2014-15 FEDERAL STUDENT
AID APPLICATION: SUPPORTING STATEMENT 10, 14 (2013), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
DownloadDocument?objectID=42690801 [http://perma.cc/2YBA-GMTJ]. A challenge for this
hours estimate is predicting participation rates, which depend on many factors including
paperwork burdens.
91. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS APPLICATION: SUPPORTING
STATEMENT 6 (2013), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=4017
8702 [http://perma.cc/SR2X-7AR4]. The same goes for the forms agencies use to evaluate
applicant disability. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., DISABILITY REPORT—ADULT: SUPPORTING
STATEMENT 4 (2013), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=3227
5801 [http://perma.cc/JL8L-KA6B] (estimating 3.5 million applicant hours without a dollar
conversion: “[t]his figure represents burden hours, and we did not calculate a separate cost
burden”).
92. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR EVIDENCE FROM DOCTOR OR HOSPITAL:
SUPPORTING STATEMENT 3 (2014), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?
objectID=45102101 [http://perma.cc/R5RS-TF75].
93. A search of OIRA’s database, see Search of Information Collection Review,
REGINFO.GOV, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRASearch [http://perma.cc/3KH8-KVA8],
conducted July 4, 2014 for new, active information collections with estimated burdens over one
million hours yielded twenty-five results, with the following five requests reporting hours
without converting to dollars: U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MONTHLY RETURN OF HUMAN
TRAFFICKING OFFENSES: SUPPORTING STATEMENT 3–4 (2014), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/
do/DownloadDocument?objectID=36394403 [http://perma.cc/D73M-NX3U] (reporting
a
three million hour burden on law enforcement officials spread over three years, without
conversion to dollars); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT: SUPPORTING
STATEMENT 4 (2012), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=3164
0403 [http://perma.cc/4J83-ZBJB] (reporting a 1.2 million hour burden in prison staff time for
13,119 facilities during the first reporting year, without conversion to dollars); INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FORM 1125-A, COST OF GOODS SOLD; FORM
1125-E, COMPENSATION OF OFFICERS: SUPPORTING STATEMENT 5 (2012), http://www.
reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=28134402 [http://perma.cc/WJG2-E5FJ]
(reporting a 44 million hour burden on corporate filers, without conversion to dollars, and
stating that “[e]stimates of the annualized cost to respondents for the hour burden shown are
not available at this time”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE., TECHNOLOGY SECURITY/CLEARANCE
PLANS: SUPPORTING STATEMENT 4 (2011), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/Download
Document?objectID=26478001 [http://perma.cc/5F4D-HVK4] (reporting a one million hour
recordkeeping burden on 100,000 recipients of nonclassified defense materials, without
conversion to dollars); OFFICE OF E-GOVERNMENT & INFO. TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, REAL PROPERTY STATUS REPORT: SUPPORTING STATEMENT 4–5 (2011),
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At the same time, many agency requests do convert hours to
dollars. Consider a humble telephone survey on public feelings about
libraries, conducted by the Institute of Museum and Library Services.
94
Not knowing who would be randomly selected for the survey, the
agency used the national average per capita income of about $20 per
95
hour to convert respondent time into dollar cost. More targeted is
the $15 per hour figure used by the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to estimate a dollar cost of filling out the
96
basic Medicare reimbursement form. This number seems to be an
average hourly wage for clerical staff at medical facilities. The Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) did something similar at the upper
end of the wage scale. For new drug applications, the agency
estimated a single average industry loaded wage rate of $75 per hour,
97
and multiplied that number by the estimated total burden hours. In
other requests, the dollar conversions are even more calibrated to
subgroups. For its acid rain regulations, the Environmental Protection
Agency estimated hourly wage rates of $66 for company technicians
98
and $102 for company managers. Or take a recent request by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Under existing regulations,
an investment fund can avoid the hassle of shareholder votes on
accountants if the fund has an independent audit committee. Creating
such a committee takes time at a board meeting, so the agency

http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=47897901
[http://perma.cc/
LG3A-L5K3] (reporting a 3.5 million hour burden on federal grant recipients with real property
in which the federal government holds an interest, without conversion to dollars).
94. See U.S. INST. OF MUSEUM & LIBRARY SERVS., PUBLIC NEEDS FOR LIBRARY AND
MUSEUM SERVICES (PNLMS) SURVEY: SUPPORTING STATEMENT 4 (2013), http://www.reginfo.
gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=48758101 [http://perma.cc/N33Q-9MYT].
95. See id. at 9 (relying on 2011 per capita income of $41,560, then assuming full-time
work).
96. The electronic version takes one minute to complete, HHS estimated, but 966 million
claims in a year add up to over 16 million hours (and supposedly over $300 million in
respondent costs for both electronic and dwindling paper filings). See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH INSURANCE COMMON
CLAIMS FORM: SUPPORTING STATEMENT 11 (2012), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
DownloadDocument?objectID=36407101 [http://perma.cc/5SXU-ZWNL].
97. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NEW DRUG
APPLICATION: SUPPORTING STATEMENT 18 (2011), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/Download
Document?objectID=24273701 [http://perma.cc/EEV7-B95W]. FDA did not explain how it
estimated the loaded rate (e.g., overhead, training, leave, taxes).
98. See U.S. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, ACID RAIN PROGRAM: SUPPORTING STATEMENT 30
(2012),
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=36362000
[http://
perma.cc/W7X3-W4B2].
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estimated an hour burden for this task and then valued paralegal time
99
at $175 per hour and director time at $500 per hour.
Agencies might put a positive dollar value on a person’s time
even when the person is unemployed. Consider the Department of
Agriculture’s recent request to adjust ongoing information collections
for the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program. The program
provides food and education to low-income pregnant women, new
100
mothers, and their children. Running WIC effectively and in accord
with federal law depends on information from vendors, state and
local officials, and applicants—including reports on applicant income
101
and a nutrition risk assessment. But unlike vendors and officials,
many applicants may not have an established market value for their
102
time. When paperwork burdens hit such people, agencies that are
committed to monetization seem to rely on the minimum wage. The
103
Department used the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour to
calculate an annual dollar cost of $4.4 million to nine million
104
applicants.
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program

99. See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, CLEARING EXEMPTION FOR
SWAPS BETWEEN CERTAIN AFFILIATED ENTITIES: SUPPORTING STATEMENT 4–6 & 10 nn.8–9
(2013),
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=41160101
[http://
perma.cc/ZX9A-QTRT] (using a figure of eight directors on average and aggregated board of
directors cost of $4000/hour); see also Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,788–
90, 44,794 nn.625 & 630 (Aug. 3, 2005) (reporting a dollar conversion in the CBA section in
which CFTC calculated issuer personnel time at $125 per hour and outside professional time at
$300 per hour).
100. See Comment Request—WIC Program Regulations, 77 Fed. Reg. 50,457, 50,458 (Aug.
21, 2012).
101. See FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., WIC PROGRAM
REGULATIONS: SUPPORTING STATEMENT 6 (2014), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/Download
Document?objectID=44959401 [http://perma.cc/A2HM-Y8JZ] (noting program changes
prompting the request).
102. Cf. Laura Tiehen & Alison Jacknowitz, Why Wait?: Examining Delayed WIC
Participation Among Pregnant Women, 26 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 518, 523 tbl.1 (2008)
(estimating that 63 percent of pregnant WIC participants were employed in the year before
giving birth).
103. See FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., supra note 101, at 16 tbl.A.12.1 (estimating 615,829
total annual burden hours for applicants); see also id. (setting state and local staff hourly wages
at $23.54 and vendor staff hourly wages at $12.55).
104. See id. at 9 (providing a dollar estimate for applicant time); FOOD & NUTRITION SERV.,
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., WIC PROGRAM REGULATIONS: BURDEN TABLE, at cells C40, F35–F39
(2014),
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=36110701
[http://
perma.cc/KCP8-GXRV] (estimating 0.05 hours for certification data for the vast majority of
nearly nine million applicants). Most WIC applicants are infants and children, see id. at cells
C35–C39, so presumably the agency estimates for them reflect burdens on adults doing
paperwork on their behalf.
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(SNAP, formerly Food Stamps) operates on similar estimates. In
2013, the Department estimated that nearly eleven million people
would spend about twenty minutes each to apply for these benefits,
and translated the resulting 3.5 million hour burden into $25 million
105
of cost to applicants at $7.25 per hour.
We lack comprehensive data on agency quantification practices.
Often it is difficult to tell how agencies estimate the time needed to
understand and complete government forms, how they choose a
universal or particular wage rate, or how they adjust wage data to
106
include costs borne by employers of respondents. Assuming that
officials seek to avoid process costs, we might expect agencies to
estimate burdens on others quickly and cheaply. Indeed OIRA
instructs agencies to economize here, generally recommending
“[c]onsultation with a sample (fewer than 10) of potential
107
respondents.” One obvious explanation for a nine-respondent limit
is avoiding another round of Paperwork Reduction Act process
108
costs. This default rule for gathering burden information will cap
the quality of those investigations, and scattered public comments will
only add so much knowledge.
For a burden estimate that seems wildly off, consider WIC
applications. The agency asserts that applicants need three minutes
109
on average to complete the application, even though eligibility
certification requires recorded data or documentation on residency,

105. See FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP) FORMS EXTENSION: BURDEN TABLE, at row 3 (2013), http://
www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=38398701 [http://perma.cc/XUL69AZ6].
106. Sometimes agencies bump up hourly wage figures by estimating hourly fringe
benefits—a form of loaded wage estimate. For a collection involving disclosure of manufacturer
payments to physicians and their families, HHS identified a physician hourly wage of $103, then
“applied a 33 percent increase to this amount to account for change overtime and fringe
benefits” to provide a likely maximum estimate of $137 per hour. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REGISTRATION, ATTESTATION,
ASSUMPTIONS DOCUMENT AND DATA RETENTION REQUIREMENTS FOR OPEN PAYMENTS:
SUPPORTING STATEMENT 7–8 (2014), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument
?objectID=43307402 [http://perma.cc/WP5L-6LY2] (doing the same for support staff and other
affected parties).
107. OMB SUPPORTING STATEMENT INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 39, at 6 (for item 12); see
also id. at 6–7 (suggesting reliance on the public comment period and existing CBA for item 13).
108. The Act is triggered when ten people are asked the same question. See supra note 29
and accompanying text.
109. See FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., supra note 104.
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110

income, diet, and blood work. Surely most applicants take far more
time than this to document eligibility, especially the first time around.
OIRA instructs agencies to count not only the time needed to fill out
a benefits application, but also “the time that an individual or entity
spends reading and understanding a request for information, as well
as the time spent developing, compiling, recording, reviewing, and
111
providing the information.” For WIC, the Department must be
estimating how long it takes applicants to hand over blood tests and
other documents already in their hands—not a broader understanding
of “compiling” and “providing” information that could include
obtaining the documents, traveling to a local WIC agency, waiting for
112
service, and participating in a nutrition assessment interview. “One
way the poor pay for government aid is with their time,” Kathryn
113
Edin and Luke Shaefer remind us. On the other hand, some
agencies do study hourly burdens thoroughly and broadly. An
example is IRS’s random sample surveys and complex Individual

110. See 7 C.F.R. § 246.7 (2014) (detailing information that must be gathered on recipients);
id. § 246.7(e)(1)(i)(A), (ii)(B) (regarding required tests for anemia).
111. 2014 OIRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 1; see also 44 U.S.C. § 3502(2)(D)–(F) (2012)
(defining “burden” to include “searching data sources” and “completing and reviewing the
collection of information”); 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(b)(1)(vii)–(ix) (2014) (same). The agency received
no public comments on the WIC collection request. An accurate count of the above-mentioned
burdens would still underestimate total applicant burdens, on a broader understanding of time
burdens for CBA. See infra Part II.B. Applicants travel to local WIC agencies, often wait before
being served, may spend time receiving instructions and questions about nutrition, and they had
to learn about the program in the first place. I thank Ellen Teller and Geri Henchy at the Food
Research and Action Center for helping me understand WIC applicant requirements and
burdens.
For examples of agency requests that do estimate respondent travel time, see U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, BIRTH AFFIDAVIT: SUPPORTING STATEMENT 3–4 (2014), http://www.reginfo.
gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=48139601 [http://perma.cc/2PDW-NTXE]; CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
EVALUATION OF THE MULTI-PAYER ADVANCED PRIMARY CARE PRACTICE (MAPCP)
DEMONSTRATION: FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEW GUIDES: SUPPORTING STATEMENT 8–9 (2013),
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=42215001 [http://perma.cc/9W
EX-ASRF]; U.S. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, QUALITATIVE TESTING OF MORTGAGE
SERVICING RELATED MODEL FORMS AND DISCLOSURES: SUPPORTING STATEMENT 6 (2012),
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=30716901 [http://perma.cc/6K
XP-7BCM].
112. Telephone Interview with Amy M. Herring, Senior Program Analyst, Supplemental
Food Programs Div., Food & Nutrition Serv. (Sept. 19, 2014) (summarizing how the 0.05 hours
estimate was reached).
113. KATHRYN J. EDIN & H. LUKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST NOTHING
IN AMERICA 2 (2015).
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114

Taxpayer Burden Model. But we cannot expect consistently highquality burden estimates, let alone firmly grounded cost-benefit
115
analysis, given limited agency resources.
Moreover, agencies vary in their commitment to monetization.
Agencies regularly monetize time burdens on organizations, it
116
appears. For time burdens borne by individuals, agency practice is
divided. Although we lack official statistics, we can get a sense of
monetization practices from a random sample of more than 160
information collection requests that reported burdens on individuals
or households and for which OIRA completed review during a recent
117
three-year period. In this sample, under 60 percent of agency
requests monetized individual or household time burdens while over
40 percent did not (Figure 1, Figure 2). These statistics do rest on
some judgment calls. Three agency requests are counted as
“monetized” when they used $0.00 as the value for time spent by
unemployed students, unemployed seniors, and recipients of
118
disability benefits. Also, the fraction of monetized requests is not
the same measure as the fraction of monetized hours. Recall that IRS

114. The Model was developed with the assistance of IBM, and it combines survey data with
respondents’ tax forms to extrapolate time and out-of-pocket costs for all taxpayers and for new
tax law proposals. See John L. Guyton, John F. O’Hare & Michael P. Stavrianos, Estimating the
Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 673, 674–81 (2003); Janet
Holtzblatt, Measuring Compliance Burdens: Issues Raised by the Individual Taxpayer Burden
Model, in PROCEEDINGS: ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION AND MINUTES OF THE
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION 366, 367 (2004).
115. Cf. Improving Implementation of the Paperwork Reduction Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,269,
55,270 (Oct. 27, 2009) (reporting OIRA’s recognition of varying quality of agency burden
estimates, with the IRS Model held out as a careful effort).
116. This is my impression based on a review of dozens of information collection requests
from the past three years.
117. Nearly all of these requests were approved without change or with a change not
apparently related to monetization. Withdrawn and improperly submitted requests were
excluded from the sample, as well as requests that appeared to burden only organizations. The
data collection method, the spreadsheet of compiled data, and the agency supporting statements
are on file with the author. I thank Rucha Desai for her extraordinary efforts on this inquiry.
118. See FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SCHOOL NUTRITION AND
MEAL COST STUDY BURDEN TABLE 1, at cells Q55–Q59 (2014), http://www.reginfo.gov/
public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=46559701 [http://perma.cc/643U-BKAE]; CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PARTS C AND D
COMPLAINTS RESOLUTION PERFORMANCE MEASURES: SUPPORTING STATEMENT 16 tbl.2
(2012),
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=34074901
[http://
perma.cc/88US-DDFS]; U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN. & NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, THE SSA-NIH
COLLABORATION TO IMPROVE THE DISABILITY DETERMINATION PROCESS: SUPPORTING
STATEMENT 14–15 tbl.A.12–2 (2012), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?
objectID=29411202 [http://perma.cc/G2YC-6MUR].
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generates a uniquely large share of the reported federal paperwork
burden, taking into account all tax forms used to report income,
exemptions, and deductions whether legally optional or not, but IRS
does not monetize time expended by individuals on their tax forms.
119
The basic individual tax forms happen not to be in this sample; if
they were, those nonmonetized hours would basically swamp the
hours monetized in this or any other sample. Either way, agencies
certainly do vary in their willingness to monetize time.
Figure 1. Fraction of Sampled Agency Requests that Monetized
Individual/Household Time, 2011–2014

119. Fifteen other IRS requests do show up in this sample. IRS did not monetize hours in
any of them.
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Figure 2. Some Agency-by-Agency Fractions of Sampled Requests that
Monetized Individual/Household Time, 2011–2014
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*As discussed in the text, the Treasury Department and its Internal
Revenue Service account for most of the total hours currently counted by
agencies, whatever the quality of those counts, but they account for far less
than half of the total number of information collection requests. The one
request in the sample from Treasury that monetized hours was generated
by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, for a customer complaint
120
form regarding bank practices.

For agency requests that do convert individual and household
time into dollars, invariably wage rates are used. But this metric
yields variation anyway because agencies are not committed to a
universal wage rate for everyone. Very different monetary values are
assigned to similar paperwork burdens based on how the labor
market values the jobs that the respondents ordinarily do (Figure 3).
Ignoring the three $0.00 values, the range in agency valuation of
people’s time is easily more than tenfold in our sample and in the
specific examples discussed above—$7.25 per hour imputed to
121
unemployed people seeking nutrition and other benefits, over $80
122
per hour for professionals such as doctors answering questions, and
over $250 per hour for the highest-income outliers such as nuclear

120. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY,
CUSTOMER COMPLAINT FORM: SUPPORTING STATEMENT 1–2 (2012), http://www.reginfo.gov/
public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=34765001 [http://perma.cc/EN7A-EE5D].
121. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUBSIDIZED AND TRANSITIONAL
EMPLOYMENT DEMONSTRATION (STED) AND ENHANCED TRANSITIONAL JOBS
DEMONSTRATION (ETJD): SUPPORTING STATEMENT 36 (2013), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/
do/DownloadDocument?objectID=39889201 [http://perma.cc/3WMS-8ZHP].
122. See OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., SURVEY OF
MEDICAL CARE PROVIDERS FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE REGIONAL EXTENSION CENTER
(REC) PROGRAM: SUPPORTING STATEMENT 8 (2013), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
DownloadDocument?objectID=49123501 [http://perma.cc/JW4J-JR8N] (using $86 per hour for
primary care physicians).
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123

scientists seeking government jobs. The sample’s distribution does
clump in the $10 to $15 range, which seems to reflect clerical wages,
and again in the $20 to $35 range, which reflects national median
hourly income plus occasional augmentation for overhead and fringe
124
benefits.
Even so, significant variance in time valuation is
undeniable.
Figure 3. Wage Rates Used in a Sample of Agency Requests that
Monetized Individual/Household Time Burdens, 2011–2014

B. OIRA
Agency variance in monetizing time is not the result of a White
House directive, but wage rates do show up in OMB guidance. OMB
instructions for agencies going back to 1995 call for estimates of outof-pocket dollar costs as well as hour burdens, and for a conversion of
the hour burdens into dollars, “identifying and using appropriate
125
wage rate categories.” More generally, OMB has encouraged
agency monetization of people’s time—but without the commitment
to hourly wages—since at least 2003. Circular A-4 on cost-benefit
analysis suggests that agencies tally time costs in dollars, and this
guidance indicates a broad understanding of time-related burdens
beyond filling out forms. The Circular explains that agencies should
123. See NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, NRC FORM 354, DATA REPORT ON SPOUSE:
SUPPORTING STATEMENT 4 (2011), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?
objectID=27489401 [http://perma.cc/9MFZ-WDKX].
124. On the link between loaded wage rates and an employer perspective on paperwork
burdens, see infra note 233.
125. See OMB SUPPORTING STATEMENT INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 39, at 6 (explaining
that, for item 12, out-of-pocket costs should exclude the cost of any hour burden); see also id.
(same for item 13).
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estimate the monetary value of significant effects including
“inconvenience costs and benefits” as well as “[g]ains or losses of
126
time in work, leisure and/or commuting/travel settings.”
OMB does not exactly advertise the conversion of hours into
dollars. The dollar value of these hours does not appear on OMB
127
forms or in a searchable format on Reginfo.gov. Confirming an
agency translation of hours into dollars requires downloading a
supporting statement or searching the Federal Register. And OIRA
treated monetization as a controversial issue worth revisiting in a
2009 request for public comments. Ideas on “[w]hether and how
burden hours should be monetized” were solicited, including whether
a universal dollar figure should be used for all information
128
collections. Also, OIRA’s annual reports nearly always count
129
hourly burdens without attempting to translate hours into dollars,
plus the President’s recent initiative to cut federal paperwork burdens
130
called for new burden-reduction ideas in hours, not dollars. Of
131
course, neither OMB nor OIRA are hiding burden information.
OIRA made a real contribution to transparency in 1995 when it
began posting agency supporting statements online. Anyone can
make their own hours-to-dollars conversions using easily accessible
hour estimates.
More important, the foregoing cannot reveal exactly how serious
agencies are about estimating, monetizing, and integrating time
burdens with other considerations when they judge whether and how

126. CIRCULAR NO. A-4, supra note 8, at 37. This guidance applies to information
collections bundled with proposed rules.
127. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PAPERWORK
REDUCTION ACT SUBMISSION (INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING OMB FORM 83-I) 3 (1995),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/83i-fill.pdf
[http://perma.cc/VYF24L5P] (item 14); ROCIS HOW TO GUIDE, supra note 48, at 40.
128. Improving Implementation of the Paperwork Reduction Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,269,
55,271–72 (Oct. 27, 2009). No policy change appears to have followed this solicitation.
129. An exception is the 2011 report: “We have not attempted to monetize this number of
hours, but it is clear that the monetary equivalent would be very high. For example, if each hour
is valued at $20, the monetary equivalent would be $176 billion.” OFFICE OF INFO. &
REGULATORY AFFAIRS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, INFORMATION COLLECTION
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 2011, at 1 (2011).
130. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
131. See generally 5 C.F.R. § 1320.14(a) (2014) (regarding public access to OMB paperwork
docket files, with exceptions for trade secrets and other risks to lawful collection of
information). An encouraging view of OMB oversight on VSL for CBA is John D. Graham,
Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 449–50
(2008).
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to collect information. The relevant officials are operating under
partially vague standards and very scarce resources. OIRA employs
fewer than fifty people to perform a range of duties, including review
of the costs and benefits of proposed regulations. These regulatory
proposals often implicate much higher stakes than information
collections within what agencies take to be the ambit of the
132
Paperwork Reduction Act. From the summer of 2013 until the
summer of 2014, OIRA’s small staff reviewed nearly 3,900
133
information
collection
requests.
Unsurprisingly,
agency
134
explanations of their collection requests tend not to be elaborate,
and OIRA does not offer in-depth public explanations for its
135
conclusions.

132. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1845 n.26 (reporting that OIRA has about forty-five
employees, mostly career staff, and reviews upwards of 700 regulatory actions per year,
although noting help from others outside the office); see also Jennifer Nou, Agency SelfInsulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1800 (2013) (reporting that
twenty to thirty OIRA staff “consistently engage in regulatory review”).
133. Based on searches on the “Search of Information Collection Review” page at
Reginfo.gov restricted to “Concluded” OIRA actions between July 30, 2013 and July 29, 2014,
OIRA approved 3,041 requests without change, plus 839 requests with changes, encountered 47
withdrawals, and denied 2 requests.
134. As the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) warned in a recent request, “The
estimated burden hours are made solely for the purpose of the Paperwork Reduction Act. The
hours are not derived from a comprehensive or even representative survey or study of the hours
to comply with Commission rules and forms.” U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RULE 173:
SUPPORTING STATEMENT 2 (2014), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?
objectID=47864701 [http://perma.cc/XVB8-9FVF].
135. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NOTICE OF
ACTION: RULE 173, at 1 (2014), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadNOA?requestID=
258033 [http://perma.cc/ARB2-A8PN] (approving SEC’s request without comment); OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NOTICE OF ACTION: FDA APPROVAL
TO MARKET A NEW DRUG 1 (2014), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadNOA?request
ID=259847 [http://perma.cc/KB6H-DTM8] (approving FDA’s request with a warning that the
scope of approval is limited by the supporting statement); cf. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.10(b) (2014)
(“OMB shall notify the agency involved of its decision to approve, to instruct the agency to
make a substantive or material change to, or to disapprove, the collection of information, and
shall make such decision publicly available.” (emphasis added)). An exception to the rule of
reticence is the process for OMB participation in public comment when an agency bundles a
proposed information collection into a proposed rule, see 5 C.F.R. § 1320.11(c) (2014), and
subsequent review after publication of any final rule, see id. § 1320.11(i) (“If OMB disapproves
or instructs the agency to make substantive or material change to the collection of information,
it shall make the reasons for its decision publicly available.” (emphases added)); see also id.
§ 1320.12(f)(1) (regarding renewed authorization). Also, independent agencies must explain
their override votes. See id. § 1320.15; see also 44 U.S.C. § 3507(f)(2) (2012) (“The agency
shall . . . explain the reasons for such vote.”).
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C. Politics
If neither formal law nor OIRA policy fully explains agency
behavior, political forces might enhance our understanding. No
straightforward political theory will account for the patterns,
unfortunately. Typical for large-scale positive theorizing, much
depends on controversial assumptions about incentives within
136
government institutions and the operative model for politics. But
something useful can be said about the politics of paperwork.
At a macro level and simplifying greatly, increases in estimated
paperwork burdens tend to decrease the scope of government
projects. The value of statistical life (VSL) moves in the opposite
direction, with increases in VSL tending to increase the scope of
137
government projects. The reason is that, conventionally, paperwork
burdens are taken to fall on the cost side of a cost-benefit analysis,
lives saved on the benefit side. If a group can influence these
estimates and if they favor (disfavor) a government project, they will
tend to prefer a lower (higher) estimated paperwork burden and a
138
higher (lower) estimated life valuation. We might then suppose that
the political left generally favors lower paperwork burden estimates
and higher VSL, while the political right generally favors the
opposite.
Furthermore, we might speculate that filling out forms is a
widespread annoyance for business concerns and households alike
that agencies cannot easily ignore altogether without political
pushback, whereas waiting in line is a burden more likely to fall on
relatively powerless people, and therefore less likely to be counted by
139
government officials who are undisciplined by competitive forces.

136. See, e.g., Gillian Lester, Can Joe the Plumber Support Redistribution?, 64 TAX L. REV.
313, 332 n.60 (2011) (discussing median voter and interest group models, among others, in the
redistribution context); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law,
118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 923–34 (2005) (regarding conflicting scholarship on agency incentives to
expand); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1767–71 (2007) (discussing positive political theory models based on
agency slack vis-à-vis congressional preferences).
137. For introductions to the concept of VSL, see supra note 8 and accompanying text and
infra Parts III.A–B.1.
138. Cf. Binyamin Appelbaum, As U.S. Agencies Put More Value on a Life, Businesses Fret,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/business/economy/17regulation.
html [http://perma.cc/T8GC-C46E] (reporting such allegations, noting variation in agency-level
VSL, and suggesting avoidance of a high-stakes issue and “flexibility” as explanations).
139. See supra note 18 (discussing queuing and exit opportunities). Occasionally, markets
that are otherwise presumed sensitive to customer time nevertheless produce highly visible time
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Indeed, in practice, information collection requests are regularly
concerned with people completing forms and not at all concerned
with people waiting around. There probably are no powerful groups
organized around paperwork per se, or statistical lives for that matter,
but these suggested valences for different estimates of costs and
benefits illuminate one facet of paperwork politics. That said, we lack
good data on whether and which agencies systematically report high
or low time burdens, however tested.
But now we do have evidence of variance in agency monetization
practices, along with reliance on wage rates when monetization
140
occurs. And we might suppose that many upper-income people
would favor individuated wage rates because this conversion tool
141
emphasizes paperwork burdens on them.
Also, certain
constituencies do seem particularly interested in paperwork burdens
and dollar figures more specifically. Professor Jeffrey Lubbers, who
contributed to Vice President Gore’s National Performance Review,
reports that “[t]he small business community was up in arms about
needless agency forms and paperwork, and the federal agency
representatives were upset about what they perceived to be needless
OMB forms and paperwork. That war of words was, not surprisingly,
won by the small business interests, and the result was an even
burdens. Think about media coverage of holiday sales openings or a new iPhone release; both
include long lines of people outside brick-and-mortar stores waiting to become the first wave of
possessors—and possibly accruing status points therefor. See, e.g., Jefferson Graham, Expect
Long Lines for iPhone this Week, USA TODAY (Sept. 14, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
tech/columnist/talkingtech/2014/09/14/look-to-long-lines-for-iphone-this-week/15626913 [http://
perma.cc/J4QA-NLQ8]. Shake Shack, which has been a popular restaurant destination in
Manhattan, both informed the public and advertised long lines with its “Shack Cam,” on the
web at https://www.shakeshack.com/location/madison-square-park/#shack-cam [http://perma.cc/
DPYS-3HHE]. This slightly modifies the tradition of exclusive nightclubs, with hordes on the
sidewalk and highly valued customers ushered in. Precisely why market phenomena such as
these are not treated as significant failures to match product availability with competent
estimates of demand—while long lines at the polls on election day are readily criticized—is
somewhat difficult to explain. Market players sometimes garner publicity benefits from the
show of intense consumer support, and these eager consumers sometimes garner admiration
from subpopulations or establish part of their identity during these episodic queuing events.
Apparently, election officials and eager voters get no such credit. Complaints about long lines at
some polling places in 2012 led to a presidential commission, which recommended a goal of
holding waiting times to under thirty minutes (without explaining the underlying valuations that
yielded this goal). See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING
EXPERIENCE 13–14 (2014), https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2014/01/Amer-Voting-Experfinal-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf [http://perma.cc/S2J7-EV4A].
140. See supra Part II.A.
141. Leaving paperwork burdens in hourly terms is more egalitarian at first glance, but the
effects depend on how agency discretion is used thereafter. See infra Part III.B.3.
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142

When OIRA
stronger [Paperwork Reduction Act in 1995].”
requested public comments in 1999, the National Association of
Manufacturers and the National Federation of Independent Business
(NFIB) endorsed monetizing business time with reference to wage
143
rates. More generally, analysts worried about federal regulatory
burdens on businesses have tried to calculate an impressive measure
of compliance costs in dollars. Nicole Crain and Mark Crain, who
served at OMB during the Reagan Administration, received
polarized media attention for a report to the Small Business
Administration’s Office of Advocacy that asserted overall compliance
144
costs of $1.75 trillion and $15,586 per household.
Perhaps, then, projects that affect businesses and higher-income
individuals are more likely to have paperwork burdens monetized via
wage rates, if the action agencies are responsive to those interests. An
employer-like perspective on paperwork costs—as a market-oriented
cost of doing business either in-house or contracted out, not as a
145
personal burden suffered by an individual —does seem to match
certain agency practices. But it is not at all clear that such presumed
preferences regarding monetization map onto larger patterns across
agencies. How likely is it, for instance, that upper-income or business
interests drive the paperwork analysis at Health and Human Services,
142. Lubbers, supra note 11, at 113.
143. See National Association of Manufacturers, Comment on OMB Notice on Improving
Implementation of the Paperwork Reduction Act 6 (Dec. 28, 2009), http://www.regulations.gov/
contentStreamer?documentId=OMB-2009-0020-0064&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=
attachment&contentType=pdf [http://perma.cc/H4V7-3FHJ] (recognizing, however, that
different businesses operate differently, including their propensity to contract out); National
Federation of Independent Business, Comment on OMB Notice on Improving Implementation
of the Paperwork Reduction Act 2 (Dec. 24, 2009), http://www.regulations.gov/content
Streamer?documentId=OMB-2009-0020-0015&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment
&contentType=msw8 [http://perma.cc/J79U-J4F2] (asserting special hardships for high-earning
small business owners who often do their own paperwork).
144. See NICOLE V. CRAIN & W. MARK CRAIN, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON
SMALL FIRMS, at iv (2010); Nicole V. Crain & W. Mark Crain, The Regulation Tax Keeps
Growing, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487038
60104575508122499819564 [http://perma.cc/5T7P-BX5B]. For reactions from the political left,
see Meteor Blades, Report Knocks Legs from Under Study Saying Regulations Cost the
Economy $1.75 Trillion, DAILY KOS (Apr. 25, 2011, 7:45 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/
story/2011/04/25/969321/-Report-knocks-legs-from-under-study-saying-regulations-cost-theeconomy-1-75-trillion [http://perma.cc/7CHH-3ZQK], and Zachary Pleat, Fox’s Attack on
Regulations Relies on Widely Discredited Cost Estimate, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Sept. 14,
2011, 4:28 PM), http://mediamatters.org/research/2011/09/14/foxs-attack-on-regulations-relieson-widely-dis/181805 [http://perma.cc/ZZ3T-BCRR] (emphasizing the use of Crain and Crain’s
data on Fox News).
145. See infra notes 233–44 and accompanying text.
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Agriculture’s Food and Nutrition Service, and Veterans Affairs
(evinced by their use of wage rates), while Census, IRS, and
Education are driven by lower-income interests (evinced by their
146
failures to monetize hours)? These characterizations are neither
intuitive nor easily proved.
To fill out a political theory, moreover, we need to know how
agencies react to paperwork burdens and, more specifically, to large
or small public estimates of those burdens on private parties (when
reported in dollars)—or how players in the political system believe
that agencies react. The answers are not self-evident. One possibility
is that agencies do not respond and burden estimates are for public
consumption alone. To the extent that agencies do respond, they have
several lawful options, not all of which with clear political valences.
Aside from rigging their burden estimates and assuming statutory
authority exists, agencies can cut estimated paperwork burdens by (1)
decreasing the number of respondents by deregulating, cutting the
number of benefits and regulatory exemptions, or deterring
applicants from seeking benefits or exemptions by generating lots of
hard questions or long wait times, or (2) decreasing response times by
asking no, fewer, or shorter questions, which tends to decrease the
147
quality of information on applicants and regulated parties, or (3)
changing the method of information collection, such as by shifting
from paper to online forms or from surveys to surveillance or existing
databases, which might not decrease information quality but often
does reduce public awareness and individual control, or (4) changing
the method of data analysis, such as by shifting from census-like raw
148
counts to small random samples and big data analytics. Any of these
presumably lawful responses could help or hurt any given ideological
camp, depending on other facts and circumstances.
At the agency level, though, politics might well help explain
specific decisions. One might suspect that IRS and its lonely
supporters would rather not show a very high burden associated with
its operations, including taxpayer time. Individual taxpayers are not
especially well organized, but their concerns can be tapped by those
146. See supra Figure 2.
147. See Wiener, supra note 11, at 494 n.153, 500 (emphasizing mixtures of costs and
benefits likely associated with reducing and increasing information demands on regulated
parties).
148. Cf. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 457 (2002) (holding that “hot-deck imputation” for
missing census data was not statutorily prohibited “sampling” and was constitutionally valid,
without judging the validity of statistical sampling).
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who are. Perhaps IRS is insulated enough from pressure to boost
149
burden estimates and the agency prefers hours to dollars. Yet IRS
seems to study hourly taxpayer burdens quite earnestly, with repeated
random sample surveys and a sophisticated model of taxpayer
behavior. Moreover, the resulting hour estimates are strikingly high.
IRS stands out among all the other agencies in OIRA annual reports
150
as imposing most of the national hourly paperwork burden. This
does not confirm or refute that IRS is sensitive enough to taxpayer
burdens or has limited discretion. But in theorizing about why IRS
seriously counts hours but does not itself convert those hours into
dollars, a simple political story is elusive. Perhaps avoiding an IRSendorsed dollar figure is best for the agency and its supporters with
151
respect to mainstream voters,
and perhaps the intense IRS
152
opponents are largely indifferent to agency monetization. After all,
anyone can convert hours to dollars once the hours are estimated.

149. IRS is not one of the agencies to which OMB or OIRA have redelegated Paperwork
Reduction Act authority, see 44 U.S.C. § 3507(i) (2012); 5 C.F.R. §§ 1320.16(d), 1320 App. A
(2014), but perhaps OIRA deference is the practice. The situation is simply not transparent to
outside observers.
150. See supra note 81. The estimate is based on agency reporting practices. IRS might be
relatively careful about estimating a larger scope of time-related burdens. See supra note 114
and accompanying text.
151. For disagreement over which numbers to use in converting hourly IRS burdens into
dollar estimates, see Glenn Kessler, John Boehner’s Misfire on the Cost of Tax Compliance,
WASH. POST: FACT-CHECKER (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/factchecker/post/john-boehners-misfire-on-the-cost-of-tax-compliance/2011/11/15/gIQArT7qPN_
blog.html [http://perma.cc/KA54-CH55] (criticizing Speaker Boehner’s reliance on a study that
used $68.42 per hour to monetize the total paperwork burden imposed by IRS). The IRS might
want to avoid officially taking sides in such disputes. People involved with developing the
Individual Taxpayer Burden Model have illustrated monetization options without
recommending a value. See Guyton et al., supra note 114, at 676, 682–83, 684 tbl.5 (asserting
there is “no consensus in the research community regarding the best method for monetizing
time,” and illustrating monetization with rates between $15 and $25 per hour).
152. For many individuals, the government already has adequate data to fill out the tax
forms on its own without taxpayer assistance. See Joseph Bankman, Using Technology to
Simplify Individual Tax Filing, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 773, 774–76 (2008). Aside from accuracy
concerns, one explanation for why IRS does not DIY most individual tax returns is political
resistance to making federal taxation any easier. See GROVER G. NORQUIST, AMS. FOR TAX
REFORM, PRESENTATION TO THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM:
IMPLEMENTING A “RETURN FREE” TAX FILING SCHEME (2005), http://govinfo.library.
unt.edu/taxreformpanel/meetings/docs/norquist_05172005.ppt [http://perma.cc/C7V4-K7A5]
(criticizing the idea as aiming to increase taxes without adequate taxpayer attention). If true,
however, this strategy does not obviously suggest a position on the quantification or
monetization of taxpayer burdens. The strategy does suggest actually high paperwork burdens
for taxpayers, but the suggestions for quantification are less clear.
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We might be left to investigate agency practice on a request-byrequest basis, to avoid falling into speculative just-so stories that
match our antecedent generalizations about politics. Why, for
instance, do officials at the Food and Nutrition Service monetize
paperwork burdens for WIC applicants by using the minimum wage,
instead of refusing to monetize or monetizing with some other tool—
or adding other time-related burdens such as travel and wait time?
Even the agency’s lowball estimate of applicant time burdens is not
easy to understand. Is this low number emblematic of the Service’s
commitment to protect WIC benefits by making the program appear
cheaper to implement, or instead to protect aspects of the program
that try to screen, educate, and reform people by making conditions
on benefits appear cheaper to execute? How much can be explained
by agency carelessness or resource constraints? Good answers to
questions like these depend on ground-level investigations.
Which prompts a final observation on the larger picture.
Paperwork burdens almost certainly receive little weight in most
decisions at OMB, OIRA, and the requesting agencies. These officials
operate under serious resource constraints and paperwork burdens
will usually strike them as low-stakes issues, as rounding errors even,
at least within the limited scope of concern intimated by the
153
Paperwork Reduction Act.
Such burdens are unimpressive
compared to other factors in cost-benefit analysis for major
regulatory proposals. In addition, a significant fraction of federal
154
paperwork is required by statute. True, agencies are supposed to
155
estimate paperwork burdens for new legislative proposals, and an
accurate accounting of paperwork burdens from existing legislative
mandates would help observers evaluate Congress’s work. But none
of this means that an agency will be motivated to immerse itself in
156
paperwork issues when the collection of information is obligatory.
More likely, agencies will roughly comply with OIRA instructions
using limited efforts; and OIRA might understandably leave in place
an old instruction asking for monetization based on hourly wages,

153. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
154. See 2014 OIRA REPORT, supra note 2, at iii, 2, 4–5 (counting most burden hours as
discretionary, but stressing factors outside agency control in explaining apparent increases in
burdens).
155. See 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1)(C) (2012).
156. A related point is that any thorough CBA depends on well-quantified benefits, which
can be difficult to ascertain for government information. See infra text accompanying notes 246–
47.
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which are readily estimable, without enthusiastic enforcement or
rethinking.
III. PAPERWORK PRINCIPLES
Paperwork politics enhance our understanding of the current
system, but core normative questions of valuation have to be
addressed at some point. Yes, agencies arguably exert more energy
generating paperwork on paperwork burdens than thoughtfully
managing the government’s information collection system, and the
situation could be stable for now. The slice of time burdens quantified
and monetized could be embedded in political compromises on the
range of benefits and burdens to take seriously. But political
compromises disintegrate over time, while the deeper normative
issues of valuation will survive. The Paperwork Reduction Act is a
narrow entryway to a broader phenomenon. Indeed, time burdens
affect all of us, whether wealthy or poor, old or young, organized,
unorganized, or disorganized. Some attention should be directed at
principles that can guide the valuation of people’s time. Here is a
start.
A. Life and Time
Agencies treat them differently but, in one sense, perhaps life
and time are fundamentally the same. Speaking practically, losing a
life or saving a life means a shorter or longer life, measured from
some baseline. Nobody’s life will be saved forever. Instead “lifeextension is always what is at issue,” as Professor Cass Sunstein
157
reminds us. When those debating policy discuss saving lives, they
probably refer to otherwise expected lifespans, measured in chunks of
158
time. And when a policy’s anticipated benefit is preventing deaths
through risk reduction, the ultimate hoped-for gain comes in the form

157. Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 205,
208 (2004) (“No program literally ‘saves’ lives . . . .”).
158. See, e.g., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF
POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 1 (2013), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/
rulemaking/pdf/Automated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf [http://perma.cc/8K43-6HDG] (discussing the
potential of self-driving cars to reduce lives lost in crashes); John Broder, E.P.A. Sets a Lower
Limit for Soot Particles in the Air, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
12/15/science/earth/epa-proposes-tighter-soot-rule.html [http://perma.cc/LJK9-HQ8U] (quoting
the chief medical officer for the American Lung Association in support of EPA policy that
could “save lives”).
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of longer life or life expectancy—more time in a life. Thus reducing
the risk of death from a particular kind of air pollution could mean
that a particular class of people end up living out an otherwise
160
average expected lifespan with which they can do more work, get
more family time, or whatever, instead of ending their lives earlier
from air pollution. If we want, we can calculate the gains to people in
(expected) life years—or even hours—instead of the crude measure
161
of lives saved. This is one way of understanding what is at stake
when lives are at stake.
A loss of time can be understood similarly. Losing time, wasting
time, or saving time means losing or gaining the use of time within a
person’s life, measured from some baseline. These references are to
allotments within a finite lifespan instead of the overall length of life,
but there is a connection through the idea of people having a life to
direct. When people discuss time in these ways, they seem to mean
162
the use of part of a lifetime, again measured in chunks of time. And
when a policy’s anticipated benefit is saving people’s time,
presumably the hoped-for gain comes in the form of relief from an
experience that the affected person would consider bad, worthless, or
less valuable than whatever else they would do with that time. Thus
reducing the time needed to complete paperwork associated with air
pollution regulation would mean that a particular class of people end
up doing other productive work, getting more family time, or
whatever, instead of filling out government forms. As with lives
saved, we can calculate gains to people in (expected) hours or even
life years. From this perspective, gains and losses of people’s time and
lives seem to dissolve into similar metrics implicating opportunity
costs.
159. See CIRCULAR NO. A-4, supra note 8, at 29 (explaining VSL as “willingness to pay for
reductions in only small risks of premature death”).
160. In the United States, the numbers are about seventy-eight years at birth and forty more
years at age forty. See Elizabeth Arias, United States Life Tables, 2009, 62 NAT’L VITAL STATS.
REPS. 1, 1, 2, tbl.A (2014).
161. OMB suggests precisely this as part of cost-benefit analysis. See CIRCULAR NO. A-4,
supra note 8, at 30 (stating that agencies “should consider providing estimates of both VSL and
[value of a statistical life year]” saved).
162. See, e.g., Ellen Bravo, Opinion, We Need Standards for Paid Time Off, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 5, 2014, 12:37 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/09/04/why-dontamericans-take-vacation-7/we-need-standards-for-paid-time-off [http://perma.cc/Z7FE-R64G]
(discussing time saving as the ability to shift from the workplace to family care); Aaron
Gouveia, 2014 Wasting Time at Work Survey: Workers are Wasting More Time Than Ever in
2014, SALARY.COM, http://www.salary.com/2014-wasting-time-at-work [http://perma.cc/DQL3P2EC] (discussing time wasted at work as including workers’ recreational web surfing).
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As well, valuing time and life requires a choice between
subjective and objective perspectives. I have been writing in
subjective terms, suggesting how people think or feel, but this is a
contested choice. Many of us consider people’s time and lives to be
valuable quite apart from any aggregation of feelings or
163
preferences. Moreover, if one wants to identify gains and losses of
time and lives, baseline choices are necessary. We can wonder
whether people are entitled to the average life expectancy of their age
group, and whether people are entitled to choose their experiences
without civic obligation to complete a census form. In addition, both
events can be planned for, in the sense that people anticipating timeconsuming obligations or death often can adjust their plans to soften
the impact. And both shortening and diverting a person’s life affects
other people’s lives; what a person would otherwise do with her life is
relevant to everyone she knows. In addition, time burdens and life
losses raise overlapping quantification issues. They can be tallied into
one universal number for one large population, or instead
individuated into different numbers for subpopulations. Judgments
must be made about whether each person’s time and life should be
valued the same.
But of course there are distinctions, including the fact that many
people recognize a special moral, religious, and emotional
164
significance to a person’s death.
These meanings might be
recognized without denying a shared category of loss when a person’s
use of time is diverted, but, even so, there is a technical sequencing
difference: a life loss always happens at the end of a lifespan while a
time burden can happen in the middle, such that time burdens may

163. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 4–6, 71, 78–82
(2000) (listing opportunities for practical reason, affiliation, normal lifespan, adequate health,
food, shelter, bodily integrity, senses and thinking, emotion, living with other species, play, and
control over political and material environments); AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED
31, 39 (1992) (listing opportunities to achieve or have certain functionings including adequate
food and shelter, good health, avoidance of premature mortality, happiness, self-respect, and
participation in community); see also JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 85–
90 (1980) (listing goods with supposed intrinsic value, including life, knowledge, friendship, play,
and religion); JAMES GRIFFIN, VALUE JUDGMENT: IMPROVING OUR ETHICAL BELIEFS 29–30
(1996) (offering understandings of accomplishment and other goods beyond subjective desires).
Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capabilities approaches for minimally just social systems aim to disregard
adaptive preferences grounded in unjust circumstances. See NUSSBAUM, supra, at 136–43; SEN,
supra, at 55.
164. See generally PHILIPPE ARIES, WESTERN ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH 85–87, 103–07
(1974) (claiming a “brutal revolution” by which death became “shameful and forbidden” in
twentieth-century Western culture).
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shape the person’s subsequent life in ways that life losses cannot. It
follows that time burdens can be partly made up for after the fact by
either an evolving retrospective evaluation of what initially felt like a
165
time loss, or by adjusting future plans to compensate for the
166
perceived loss.
At this point, however, one might still stress the similarities and
conclude that paperwork is a lot like death, only more complicated.
But the most elementary difference is experience, in that what people
typically call lost or wasted time actually involves real-world human
experiences. Death does not. “Time” in this context is a stand-in for a
multitude of experiences—some valuable, some net negative, some
167
perhaps worthless. People allocate the lifetime available to them
partly based on how they value different experiences and their
168
opportunity costs—a lesson in economist Gary Becker’s work —and
we might think of unwelcome or unjustified experiences imposed on a
person’s life as a loss to that person involving the difference between
two different sets of experiences. Experience may not be all there is
169
to life or the only value in a human life, but, on this ground alone,

165. See infra note 231.
166. See WILBERT E. MOORE, MAN, TIME AND SOCIETY 6 (1963) (distinguishing money
and stating that “[t]ime lost is never truly regained, although the effects of loss may be
compensated by greater intensity of use”).
167. Certain injuries might amount to something close to an early death, such as a coma,
although these injuries tend to have lasting effects on the person’s subsequent life. On the other
hand, every detected injury might include a time loss that is worth differentiating from other
elements of the injury, and these time losses can be compared to an early death.
168. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of the Allocation of Time, 75 ECON. J. 493, 495, 498
(1965) (presenting a microeconomic model of rational choice in which time is an input that is
combined with market goods to produce commodities that deliver utility, such as watching a
play, sleeping, or having children). One critique of Becker’s model of family decisionmaking is
noted in F. Thomas Juster & Frank P. Stafford, The Allocation of Time: Empirical Findings,
Behavioral Models, and Problems of Measurement, 29 J. ECON. LIT. 471, 492, 495 (1991)
(identifying process benefits, which can be positive or negative, that accompany production of
household commodities such as meals and cleaning). There also is a behavioral critique of
Becker’s rational actor model, applying prospect theory and other decisionmaking patterns to
the expenditure of time. See infra notes 224–27 & 230–31 and accompanying text. But the ideas
that people have a limited amount of time to allocate, that the allocation involves trade-offs,
and that time is a resource often combined with other things to produce a sense of well-being,
obviously remain useful and influential.
169. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 67 (1996) (exploring intrinsic and
objective value of life); Michael J. Perry, Is the Idea of Human Rights Ineliminably Religious?,
27 U. RICH. L. REV. 1023, 1060 (1993) (exploring sacred value in a religious sense); see also
Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort Compensation, 75
TEX. L. REV. 1567, 1586–87, 1591–92 (1997) (conceptualizing human flourishing in experiential
and nonexperiential senses, with applications in tort law).
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one might fairly conclude that life losses and time burdens are deeply
different.
The Paperwork Reduction Act might seem like a footling
concern at the moment, but the Act’s focus on paperwork helps test
the experience-based distinction between time and life loss.
Completing a tax form or a WIC application is a good candidate for
meaningless experience. For many people, no skill, joy, civic pride, or
other notable effect arrives with the mundane exercises required to
answer these questions. Their lives are given over to a task about
which they are basically indifferent, to a point that some might just as
well be unconscious. Even those convinced that such duties are
perfectly justified in a social sense need not place any independent
value on doing the work. This hardly makes paperwork the same as
death, but what people consider lost or wasted time gestures toward
one aspect of the loss when a life ends. Objections to time burdens
often, but not always, claim something better or worse than a simple
loss of time. What the government has done under the Act is take the
slice of human experience perhaps most like expected lifespan
reductions and then value the two consequences in very different
ways.
B. Time and Money
More can be done to compare life risks and time burdens, but
nothing above indicates a reason for agencies to convert one and not
the other into dollar values, let alone for the Department of
Agriculture to monetize time and IRS not. Below I will contend that
valuing people’s time should prompt fewer doubts about
monetization than valuing statistical lives. Neither life nor time is
money, actually, but saving time and saving life are similar enough
that monetized values can be used for both as one part of a thoughtful
policy analysis. Although I sympathize with time-monetization
efforts, I will go on to suggest that hourly wages are often the wrong
basis for monetizing time burdens. Strong objections can be made on
both welfarist and egalitarian principles. Opposition to hourly wages
and the best alternative depend on contested normative commitments
that I will not pretend to adjudicate for the reader, but these issues do
require attention to make progress under current law and beyond.
1. Welfare. For those who want government decisions to take
into account social welfare measured by aggregated individual
judgments, dollars have become a convenient common metric for
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people’s valuation of policy consequences. When existing markets
do not already monetize particular costs or benefits, a familiar
measure is willingness to pay (WTP) through contingent valuation
surveys and labor market data indicating, for instance, how much
171
actual people appear to price reductions in small risks of death.
These are the technologies on which agencies build their monetized
172
value of a statistical life. Of course many people are convinced that
dollars are an inappropriate measure of some human values, such as
life or civic duty, or at least that dollars fail to capture fully how
173
people do or should value outcomes. An economic version of social
welfare is not a complete guide to moral judgment, anyway. All of
this is old news, and I want to avoid unnecessary repetition of old
arguments about welfarism. My point here is that, however powerful
the objections to monetization, they apply with no more bite to time
burdens, and almost surely less.
a. Willingness-to-pay complaints.
Consider several typical
complaints about WTP: (1) WTP technologies may be inaccurate
174
because self-reporting does not necessarily show actual preferences;
170. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS 16 (2006); Matthew Adler & Eric A. Posner, Happiness Research and CostBenefit Analysis, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S253, S265–69 (2008); Robert W. Hahn, The Economic
Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1021, 1049 (2004)
(“Guidelines for cost-benefit analysis typically encourage analysts to monetize costs and
benefits to the maximum extent reasonable.”). In works like these, social welfare is some
function of individual or idealized preferences for different policy outcomes. For a proposal to
use a hedonic conception of well-being, see John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco &
Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603, 1611
(2013).
171. See RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY 48–
49 (2008); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser, On Justifying Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1037, 1057 (2000) (“[C]ost-benefit analysis prices policies, not the consequences of those
policies [such as death and other irreplaceable commodities].”).
172. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
173. A recent treatment with attention to civic duty is MICHAEL SANDEL, WHAT MONEY
CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 8–11, 60–65 (2012) (collecting concerns about
markets based on inequality, corruption of value, and backfire in terms of reduced civic virtue);
see also ADLER & POSNER, supra note 170, at 134 (acknowledging that a project’s “morality
does not depend on how much people are willing to pay to vindicate their moral views”). For
more on civic duty, see infra Part III.B.1.c.
174. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do People Mean What They
Say? Implications for Subjective Survey Data, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 67, 67–69, 71 (2001) (noting
that people may forecast their feelings inaccurately or retroactively reshape their valuations,
although surveys still might help explain behavioral differences across subjects); Jerry Hausman,
Contingent Valuation: From Dubious to Hopeless, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 44–46 (2012)
(asserting an upward-bias in answers to WTP hypotheticals); see also Amartya Sen, The
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(2) WTP is influenced by limits on information and cognition,
including difficulties people have understanding small risks and
175
predicting their well-being in new circumstances, and employee and
consumer behavior do not necessarily reflect thoughtful risk
176
valuations; (3) WTP is influenced by ability to pay, which can drive
the numbers more than the amount of well-being that the person
177
anticipates or will experience; (4) WTP can be influenced, even
178
zeroed out, by adaptive preferences that embrace unjust conditions;
(5) WTP figures sometimes differ from willingness to accept (WTA)
figures, raising questions about which measure is better in principle
and whether the gap suggests non-rational framing or endowment
179
effects.

Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 931, 945–47 (2000) (criticizing standard
WTP surveys as applied to public goods that require collective effort).
175. See Hausman, supra note 174, at 47–49 (noting odd framing and scope effects); George
Loewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn’t It Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings, in WELLBEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 85, 88–92 (Daniel Kahneman, Ed
Diener & Norbert Schwarz eds., 1999) (reviewing studies often indicating poor affective
forecasting).
176. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 64 (1998).
177. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 170, at 130 (contending that “dollars . . . do not
accurately reflect relative well-being when endowments differ”); Sunstein, supra note 157, at
229; cf. Hammitt & Robinson, supra note 9, at 7–14 (discussing theory and evidence that small
mortality risk reductions are luxury goods). Whether to do anything and what to do about
wealth or income effects is a controversial matter. For instance, one might want to see
unadjusted WTP for particular policy options but then shift wealth around through other means,
or finance the policy such that poor people pay less in fact, or adjust the applicable socialwelfare function. In the text, I am raising standard concerns without resolving them. Another
concern involves the importance to some people of their relative economic position, and
therefore whether they are confident that others will pay, too. See Robert H. Frank & Cass R.
Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 326 (2001). It
seems no different in kind from the other concerns, for my purposes.
178. See Sunstein, supra note 157, at 229 (“People’s preferences might have adapted to
deprivation or injustice.”).
179. See, e.g., Hausman, supra note 174, at 46–47; John K. Horowitz & Kenneth E.
McConnell, Willingness to Accept, Willingness to Pay and the Income Effect, 51 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 537, 537–45 (2003) (distinguishing WTP–WTA gaps found in past studies from
hypothesized income-effect explanations). But cf. Thomas J. Kniesner, W. Kip Viscusi & James
Patrick Ziliak, Willingness to Accept Equals Willingness to Pay for Labor Market Estimates of
the Value of a Statistical Life, 48 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 187, 202–03 (2014) (finding no
statistically significant WTP–WTA differential for fatality risks inferred from panel data on a
cohort of job switchers).
Other, deep concerns about WTP or WTA as a foundation for CBA involve
aggregation: whether such data show each person’s cardinal as opposed to merely ordinal
preferences, and whether such data are interpersonally comparable in the sense of being scaled
the same across individuals. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 171, at 1040–41, 1052 n.32. Some
responses are gathered in ADLER & POSNER, supra note 170, at 39–52. But again, the problem is
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Each of these objections is more or less potent (and overcome)
for life and time, on the understanding that the former involves small
probabilities of extending lives and the latter involves people getting
one life experience instead of another. Self-reporting is a problem
either way, while informational and cognitive issues probably are less
severe for time-related burdens. A time burden survey would pose
valuation questions on commonplace experiences, like filling out a
form or waiting in line—not a 1/10,000 risk of suffering the ultimate
loss. People are subject to such risks constantly but that does not
make familiar either the probabilities or the effort to monetize them.
If market behavior is a partial solution to survey problems, then
market data is available for time burdens, too. Indeed, there are
thriving markets for government paperwork in particular and for time
180
burdens more generally. Barriers remain to accurately measuring
time-related WTP, but the challenges are comparable to converting
surveys, job decisions, and smoke detector purchases into monetized
181
values for life-risk reductions.
Other objections persist no matter how accurate the WTP
technology, and they persist for time burdens as well. Many people’s
low ability to pay will drive down their willingness to pay for
mortality risk reductions and to avoid time burdens, opting more
often for DIY safety precautions, paperwork, queuing, and so on. As
a response, WTP for both time and VSL can be weighted according to
182
the diminishing marginal utility of money, with some complications.
But whether or not adjustment is a good idea, there is no a priori
reason to drive out (adjusted) WTP for time-related burdens alone.
As for adaptive preferences, it is entirely possible that certain groups
of people have become too accustomed to paperwork and other time
no worse in aggregating WTP–WTA numbers for paperwork or other time-related burdens than
it is for life risks.
180. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
181. It has been pointed out that VSL within CBA monetizes risks before death, not life or
death per se from an ex post perspective. See Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death, and Time: A
Comment on Judge Williams’ Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 284
(2001) (following John Broome, Trying to Value a Life, 9 J. PUB. ECON. 91, 95–96 (1978)).
Monetizing the value of people’s time actually doing paperwork does not share this limitation.
182. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 170, at 142–46 (noting technical difficulties with
choosing the appropriate adjustment, dynamic market responses, problematic incentive effects,
and tax-and-transfer alternatives). A recent review of mathematical formulas for distributional
weighting, to make CBA a better test for social-welfare gain, is Matthew D. Adler, Cost-Benefit
Analysis and Distributional Weights: An Overview 2 (Aug. 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5813&context=faculty_scholarship
[http://perma.cc/RF6Z-RLFK].
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burdens, according to some normative framework, and that other
groups have become too accustomed to avoiding the same. A public
spirited decisionmaker might then disregard or modify people’s
subjective WTP in setting policy. But what reason is there to believe
that adaptive preferences are more problematic for time burdens than
for life risks? Both situations involve the challenges of distinguishing
troubling from welcome adaptation, and of properly adjusting policy
to account for either.
On the other side of the ledger, converting time burdens into
dollar figures using WTP would yield advantages similar to today’s
VSL practices. The conversion would make time burdens easy to plug
into an overall cost-benefit analysis, assuming that other costs and
benefits are monetized. There are then the standard claims that
monetized CBA promotes transparent and rational administrative
decisionmaking over arbitrary or subjective judgments shrouded in
183
assertions of expertise by influential operators. Anyone with serious
doubts about these claims is entitled to keep them when CBA
includes monetized time burdens and not just monetized life-saving
benefits.
b. Efficiency, distribution, and subsidies. Cost-benefit analysis
can be cut down to a decision procedure for correcting market
failures and promoting economic efficiency, apart from distributional
goals. This conception of CBA takes market allocations as generally
good, including wealth distribution, and so use of unadjusted WTP for
184
unpriced goods makes sense. Such a narrow mission captures the
classic example of environmental regulation to protect third-party
185
health—with scrubbers in smokestacks, say.
As a matter of
institutional choice, moreover, agencies regulating particular activities
and specializing in market failures are unlikely to have the right

183. See, e.g., REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 171, at 13; Christopher C. DeMuth &
Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075,
1081–82 (1986); Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1137, 1140–42 (2001); cf. Michael A. Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency
Independence, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 609, 688 (2014) (emphasizing agency influence over CBA but
also accountability to experts).
184. See David A. Weisbach, Distributionally-Weighted Cost Benefit Analysis: Welfare
Economics Meets Organizational Design 18 (2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2450142 [http://perma.cc/8DRL-QW8T] (“[I]f the task is only to correct a market
failure, CBA should not be adjusted to add distributive weights.”).
185. A search for “scrubber” in Westlaw’s Journals & Law Reviews database on August 29,
2014 yielded 990 hits.
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jurisdiction, information, or tools to execute sound redistribution
186
policy. If we care about social welfare in a broad sense, we can leave
redistribution to tax-and-transfer agencies and laws. In fact, using
unadjusted WTP suggests that all transfer programs flunk standard
CBA: one side loses what another gains, plus somebody pays for
187
administrative costs (including paperwork).
That said, social welfare beyond economic efficiency remains
relevant to any committed welfarist. Wealth-adjusted WTP can be
188
useful on that score. And many of the paperwork examples
reviewed above fall into the transfer program category. Think about
WIC, student aid applications, and even IRS forms, depending on
how one categorizes the tax code. The narrow economic-efficiency
version of CBA does not apply to these programs, so welfare
maximizers must either adjust for wealth effects or use something
other than standard CBA to evaluate such policies. Regardless,
welfarists in the subjective-valuation camp need to know something
about how actual people actually experience and value time burdens.
Wealth-adjusted WTP is one measure of this when prices are elusive.
Finally, agencies can perform cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) for
189
transfer programs even if wealth-adjusted CBA is ruled out,
evaluating which of many possible designs will accomplish the same
transfers for the least cost or accomplish the most transfers at a given
190
cost. Monetizing time burdens remains useful for CEA, and wealth-

186. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667–68 (1994) (claiming that
redistribution distorts work incentives regardless, but redistribution via legal rules adds
inefficiency in the regulated activities); Weisbach, supra note 184, at 29–34 (making the
institutional competence claim).
187. See Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 53 DUKE L.J.
1067, 1060–69, 1076 (2003). I put aside arguments that redistribution will not otherwise occur,
see, e.g., R. Layard & A.A. Walters, Income Distribution: Allowing for Income Distribution, in
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 179, 196–97 (Richard Layard & Stephen Glaister eds., 2d ed. 1994),
and that regulatory agencies are adequately positioned to take up the slack.
188. I am not claiming that other responses to wealth effects, such as adjusting the socialwelfare function, are worse. Surely efforts should be made to avoid imposing benefits on poor
people who do not value those goods as much as rich people. Money is not one of those “luxury
goods,” however.
189. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735–36 (Oct. 4, 1993); Sunstein,
supra note 11, at 1869 (“When OIRA reviews budgetary transfer rules, its role may be limited
to . . . avoid[ing] excessive or unjustified expenditures.”).
190. See LESTER B. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION 19–21 (1981)
(emphasizing that CEA cannot interrogate given goals and budgets); Posner, supra note 187, at
1069–70 (similar).
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adjusted WTP for individuals should get welfarists closer to
understanding welfare effects.
A related and narrower normative issue involves a felt
distinction between information disclosures somehow mandated by
law and information offered to satisfy a condition for a regulatory
exemption or other optional government benefit. OIRA keeps tabs
191
on these categories of collections, along with voluntary responses.
Even putting aside conceptual problems with maintaining such
192
penalty/subsidy distinctions, welfarists should want to understand
what people experience when they complete paperwork of any kind
and for any purpose. Knowing whether completing a form will take
five minutes or one hour helps everyone price out the policy options,
so to speak. This is true whether the respondent is doing the work to
avoid paying a fine, to remain in business, to obtain cash transfers, or
to donate information so that officials can make informed decisions.
Each of these situations implicate policy trade-offs that can be
thoroughly evaluated for likely welfare effects only if we assign values
to each of these experiences from the respondent perspective. If one
is open to supporting a transfer or exemption program of some
dimension to assist the beneficiaries, then it will rarely make sense to
drive the hardest possible bargain with them by ignoring their
preferences on time-related burdens. The goal, on these assumptions,
is not to extract the most time from applicants in exchange for the
fewest possible payouts and exemptions.
Of course, one might outright oppose a so-called subsidy apart
from the associated time “burdens,” just as one might oppose a socalled mandate backed by a penalty that requires no paperwork. But
understanding and quantifying the associated use of time not only
enhances our knowledge about how different policy choices play out
in the real world, this information also can be used to restrict the use
of otherwise troubling programs. Both enthusiastic supporters and
deep skeptics of a given welfare program or tax deduction should
want to know how different versions of those policies affect how and

191. See supra note 33 (indicating that the statute requires counting all of these categories as
burdens); supra note 154 (referencing OIRA reporting).
192. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 299–300 (1993)
(questioning the entitlement baseline choices required to distinguish penalties from nonsubsidies); Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions
Everywhere: The Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 61, 63, 70, 74 & 74 n.18 (2013) (questioning the transaction framing choices
required to distinguish penalties from non-subsidies).
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how often those policies are used. A beneficiary class’s WTP to avoid
various time burdens that stand in the way of a regulatory exemption
or a cash payment is bound to affect the use and quality of the
193
program. So, disliking subsidy programs is not a good reason for
refusing to understand how they work.
c. Civic duty objections. Before moving on, we should circle back
to civic duty. There is a perfectly respectable argument that some
alleged time burdens should be understood as duties of citizenship or
of community members in good standing. The decennial census,
certain tax forms, compulsory military service, and jury duty are
intuitive candidates, and the idea might include voting even if not
required by law. One might link the concept of civic duty to ongoing
commensurability and monetization debates surrounding the
valuation of “lives saved” by government policy, though the problem
has a slightly different spin. Here we are concerned with the use of
people’s lives for what proponents believe is the public good, and how
complaints about the time costs of these duties should be evaluated.
A strong version of the civic duty position is that any burden felt
by individuals is no reason to limit the scope or deny the validity of
these duties. Bad feelings would be overridden by good citizenship, so
to speak. A mere cost-effectiveness analysis might then seem
sufficient; hours alone can serve that purpose. A moderate version of
the position is that, even if people’s preferences count for something
in specifying civic duties, the time needed to fulfill a well-justified
civic duty should not be monetized. Thinking about these experiences
in dollar terms might mischaracterize a moral imperative as a
194
disposable commodity, and taking “shadow prices out of the
193. See infra text accompanying notes 212–14 & 228–31 (discussing information-heavy
policies that attempt to learn about or teach people, or even screen out potential beneficiaries,
compared to less precise policies that are cheaper informationally).
194. Cf. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 190 (1993) (“By
regarding [human life and environmental quality] as commodity values, cost-benefit analysis
fails to consider the proper roles they occupy in public life.”); SANDEL, supra note 173, at 10
(raising concerns about the effect of markets and monetary incentives on civic duties, and
calling for a case-by-case moral inquiry into the proper way to value goods); Frank Ackerman &
Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1553, 1567 (2002) (suggesting that CBA in the environmental protection
context is cold and crazy, and alleging that “[c]ost-benefit analysis turns public citizens into
selfish consumers and interconnected communities into atomized individuals”); Laurence H.
Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83
YALE L.J. 1315, 1329–32 (1974) (offering concerns about policy analysis that reduces valuation
questions to human preferences).
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shadows” might crowd out feelings of ethical obligation that help
195
social systems run well. Indeed certain tasks have full value only
with effort; maybe voting and taxation can be made too easy. These
196
ideas do not fully fit or explain agency practices, but the ideas
deserve recognition.
The strong version of civic duty rejects or cabins standard
welfarism, and so the objection should be flagged without repeating
old basal debates. For present purposes, we can observe that ignoring
people’s selfish complaints on moral grounds will not distinguish time
from statistical life valuation, nor endorse agency use of hourly wages
to value either good. The moderate version of the civic duty position,
in contrast, can be viewed as a friendly warning within welfarism.
Those seeking accurate representations of subjective human
experience as a basis for social-welfare calculations have no use for
misleading language or metrics; crowding out socially beneficial
phenomena is no good to welfarists either. These concerns are best
supported by evidence, though, not mere guesses about what happens
when officials think about time in dollar terms or ask a random
sample of people to monetize paperwork burdens. The same
evidentiary call applies to concerns that civic pride is lost unless, for
instance, people complete their own tax returns or spend time waiting
for a chance to vote.
Whatever the precise scope of our civic duties, a useful measure
is needed to decide whether the second hour in line or the second
round of forms is worth it. Even census forms ask for demographic
information beyond a mere enumeration of people. Without ending
any debate, I will note that dollars can be an adequate measure of at
least part of the burden among the imperfect options—and that a
plausible version of civic duty will reach only some of the time

195. SANDEL, supra note 173, at 61; cf. id. at 64 (asserting that “often [actual] market
incentives erode or crowd out nonmarket incentives”); LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO
LOVE FORM 1040, at 5 (2013) (defending a mass return-based tax system on its potential to
develop civic virtue, but recommending tax simplification and recognizing costs in time, dollars,
and “headaches”); Bruno S. Frey, Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Reiner Eichenberger, The Old Lady
Visits Your Backyard: A Tale of Morals and Markets, 104 J. POL. ECON. 1297, 1306, 1311 (1996)
(reporting survey results in which local support for a nuclear waste site dropped when
respondents were told that Parliament would compensate residents with annual money
payments, and suggesting in-kind compensation); Kathleen D. Vohs, Nicole L. Mead &
Miranda R. Goode, The Psychological Consequences of Money, 314 SCIENCE 1154, 1154–56
(2006) (reporting experimental results in which participants primed with money images and
ideas worked longer without asking for help and were less willing to help or work with others).
196. See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.
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burdens under discussion. We do not have to pretend that money
terms are the ideal way to discuss all human values. We may still
believe that transparently comparable scores for various
consequences contribute to thoughtful, practical policy evaluation.
2. Hourly wages. One might now wonder how close current
agency practices already are to a WTP approach, at least for the slice
of time burdens covered by the Paperwork Reduction Act. Most
information collection requests do convert hours into dollars, as we
saw in Figure 1, using hourly wage data for different classes of
respondents. Those are market prices for the use of people’s time.
But, with exceptions for burdens on organizations and individuals
who contract out, these prices for employment time are not what
WTP drives at.
a. Willingness to pay distinguished. Willingness to pay for an
outcome is a way of estimating the intensity of individuals’ subjective
valuations, which can be aggregated into a proxy for the socialwelfare effect of a given policy. The actual preferences of individuals
197
are the targets, not a market or third-party valuation per se. The
goal is finding out how strongly those people value the effects of a
policy option, not how markets value those people. “Adoption of
WTP as the measure of value implies that individual preferences of
the affected population should be a guiding factor in the regulatory
198
analysis,” as OMB puts it. In contrast, hourly wages earned by or
imputed to the individual respondents of information collections are
the market prices for those people to perform their ordinary jobs, not
necessarily to do federal paperwork. These hourly wages do not
necessarily correspond either to the respondents’ own subjective
valuations or to valuations of the paperwork experience at issue. If
actual hourly wages were the correct measure, the time of
unemployed people would receive zero value (and no concern). That
answer cannot be correct.

197. See, e.g., E.J. MISHAN & EUSTON QUAH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 69 n.1 (5th ed.
2007) (“[W]hatever he chooses to do with this ‘leisure,’ the economist has to accept the worker’s
own evaluation of it in calculating his opportunity cost.”); Kornhauser, supra note 171, at 1039
(“[T]ypically [in CBA], individual well-being is understood as the satisfaction of subjective
preferences . . . .”). A laundered-preferences version of CBA is defended in ADLER & POSNER,
supra note 170, at 150–53.
198. CIRCULAR NO. A-4, supra note 8, at 19.
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Cost-benefit analysis could operate otherwise, of course. Projects
could be valued according to how well they further an objective
199
theory of the good, or a collective judgment about what each of us is
worth to the rest of us. Officials might determine that a person’s
market wage indicates the price to society of losing that person’s
ordinary work time; from this perspective, NFIB had a point when it
asserted that “a small business owner’s time is more valuable than
200
most other paperwork filers.” Less controversially, we should want
measures of social welfare to capture ripple effects of policies on
people indirectly affected, including consumers and beneficiaries who
might receive less when organizations do more paperwork. However
relevant this factor is to thorough policy evaluation, WTP can be used
to add something else: the subject’s own judgment. Remember that
lost earnings were used to price saved lives early in the history of
201
VSL, and this approach was abandoned for multiple reasons.
Market wages left out how those at risk valued their own safety and
nonwork experiences. Hourly wages are no more appropriate, in
principle, for valuing people’s time in terms of how those people
value their time. Something central to social welfare is lost when the
burdened person’s own experience is omitted from the calculus.
The difference in practice should not be overstated. A person’s
WTP to avoid spending an hour doing a given type of paperwork
might be close to the wage this person would receive for an additional
202
hour at his or her ordinary job. But the equivalence would depend
199. See supra note 163.
200. National Federation of Independent Business, supra note 143, at 2.
201. See LAVE, supra note 190, at 40–41 (noting older uses of wage loss and endorsing
WTP/WTA); REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 171, at 47–48 (citing risk aversion among
those facing life risks, as well as their utility from life beyond earnings, as reasons for the shift
away from using wage losses); see also Hammitt & Robinson, supra note 9, at 15 (“Intuitively, it
seems reasonable to assume that an individual’s VSL would be at least as great as his or her
expected future income, because life is about more than producing income.”). Another problem
was valuing the lives of people receiving no market wages (zero must be the wrong answer) and
the large variance in market valuation of people’s labor (at least without resorting to a universal
average wage figure).
202. If a person has chosen a mixture of leisure time and work time such that the person is
basically indifferent to more work with more pay or more leisure without pay, and if work is
valued only as a way to get wages, perhaps the wage that would be paid for another unit of work
time approximates the dollar value to that person of a unit of leisure time. If the person now
faces an hour of government paperwork, that hour can come out of leisure time, work time, or
both, and the dollar value of that time might then be the person’s hourly wage. See Becker,
supra note 168, at 498 (“Households in richer countries . . . forfeit money income in order to
obtain additional utility, i.e., they exchange money income for greater amount of psychic
income . . . . [T]he amount of money income forfeited measures the cost of obtaining additional
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on a coincidence of factors, including the character of the
respondent’s current job, the character of the time burden, and the
respondent’s feelings about each. People assign different amounts or
kinds of well-being to various activities, and not everyone will assign
the same value to another hour at their job and another hour doing
government paperwork. Probably millions of people receive job
satisfaction far beyond what they get from completing a federal tax
form, and probably millions experience frustration or outrage when
203
facing the latter. Probably millions of other people are clockwatchers who think that their jobs are mind-numbing dead ends,
while some people experience a sense of social contribution when
completing a census form. The probability of mismatch only increases
as we move to a wider range of time-related burdens, including
commuting, waiting around, hearing lectures, giving blood, and more.
204
The timing of a new burden also can affect valuation, and there is
the empirical question of which endeavors people will forgo when
they do paperwork instead. More job time is not always the correct
205
answer.
We can speculate about people without jobs, as well. If you
believe that a person is choosing not to work for wages, then the
minimum wage is a strange choice for that person’s own valuation of
doing federal paperwork. The minimum wage is not enough to draw

utility.”). But none of this seems to fully account for the (hedonic) experience of the person
doing paperwork, and those experiences will be different depending on the particular timerelated burden and the values of the person undergoing the experience.
203. Or even spiritual threat. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699–701 (1986) (indicating
that government might not be able to require Native American applicants to use Social Security
numbers in welfare applications).
204. See, e.g., Lonnie Golden & Barbara Wiens-Tuers, To Your Happiness? Extra Hours of
Labor Supply and Worker Well-Being, 35 J. SOCIO-ECON. 382, 394 (2006) (finding nuanced
relationships across workers between overtime, including mandatory overtime, and various selfreported happiness indicators, including feelings of work–family balance); Paula Span, Death’s
Companion: Paperwork, N.Y. TIMES: THE NEW OLD AGE (Mar. 15, 2012, 2:14 PM), http://
newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/deaths-companion-paperwork [http://perma.cc/6ZWG
-KPZC] (discussing paperwork burdens on grieving survivors).
205. See, e.g., Peter M. Feather & W. Douglass Shaw, The Demand for Leisure Time in the
Presence of Constrained Work Hours, 38 ECON. INQUIRY 651, 652, 660 (2000) (developing a
labor supply model that incorporates underemployment and overemployment resulting from
fixed-hour jobs, which can help observers draw inferences about subjective valuation of leisure
time and commuting); Trudy Ann Cameron, Revealed and Stated Preference Estimation of the
Value of Time Spent for Tax Compliance 20 (2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
author) (listing reasons why hourly wages need not reflect a person’s subjective valuation of the
opportunity cost of their time). Cameron’s review of time valuation options was commissioned
by IRS. See Guyton et al., supra note 114, at 676 n.4.
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the person into the paid workforce; it would be, at best, a lower
bound on the person’s monetary value for unemployment. If instead
you believe that a person is involuntarily unemployed, then we still
need to know how that person values their ability to look for work,
care for children, and do whatever else would be crowded out in favor
of government paperwork. Market wages for other activities are not
the right numbers. Using hourly wages suggests, for instance, that
unemployed people applying for disability benefits are roughly ten
times less annoyed by the relevant paperwork than the physicians
who evaluate the applicants. That is not credible.
Running an institution requires imperfect proxies, of course, and
an overly sophisticated paperwork reduction program will itself
generate costs. Today, hourly wages for many classes of workers are
readily available, while data on WTP to avoid paperwork burdens
206
appears to be nonexistent. Plus, many agency collection requests are
trivial on per capita and per collection measures. For those matters,
we can tolerate mid-level officials reading through proposed forms
and making educated guesses about respondent burdens, superior
207
alternatives, and informational benefits. Casual treatment of time
burdens can be defended when the overall stakes are low and the
other effects of a policy are hard to quantify and monetize, anyway.
The hours add up, however. And paperwork costs are the core
costs for some policies. Consider the estimated $250 million in firstyear paperwork costs for the Food and Drug Administration’s new
208
rule for reporting calories on restaurant menus. Furthermore, many
information collections are bundled with regulations already subject
to a monetized cost-benefit analysis; poorly quantified or
nonmonetized burdens undermine that analysis. Likewise, when

206. There are happiness studies covering, for example, commuting. See, e.g., Daniel
Kahneman, Alan B. Krueger, David A. Schkade, Norbert Schwarz & Arthur A. Stone, A
Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day Reconstruction Method, 306
SCIENCE 1776, 1777 tbl.1 (2004) (surveying employed women and reporting a positive affect
score of nearly 3.5 and a negative affect score of under 0.9 out of 6.0 for commuting, with
working at about 3.6/1.0 and relaxing at about 4.4/0.5).
207. Another option is intensive spot-checks for far fewer proposed information collections.
208. Compare Food Labeling, 79 Fed. Reg. 71,156, 71,248–49 (Dec. 1, 2014) (estimating
about $250 million in first-year implementation costs for the Paperwork Reduction Act
analysis), with FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NUTRITION LABELING OF STANDARD MENU ITEMS IN
RESTAURANTS AND SIMILAR RETAIL FOOD ESTABLISHMENTS 61–62 (2014), http://www.fda.
gov/downloads/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/LabelingNutrition/UCM423985.pdf [http://
perma.cc/22D7-A99W] (estimating about $397 million in mean first-year implementation costs
for the overall cost-benefit analysis).
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policy options are compared, information-laden options become less
209
alluring if time is counted carefully. Trying to learn about regulated
parties or to educate benefits applicants takes time, and carefully
estimating those burdens in familiar metrics helps us evaluate
whether the gains are worth the time. However narrow the
210
Paperwork Reduction Act’s concern, OMB’s guidance on costbenefit analysis opens the way to an inclusive accounting of time
211
burdens,
which increases the importance of measuring and
monetizing well. Moreover, even relatively short time burdens can
have significant behavioral effects. We need not speculate about the
212
participation effects of the initial Healthcare.gov crashes; consider
213
214
participation in WIC and 401(k) retirement plans, which seem
sensitive to less-than-impressive paperwork barriers. That
government also saves people vast, unquantified amounts of time by
enhancing physical security, protecting property, enforcing contracts,
and much more is not a strong reason to poorly quantify government215
related time burdens. Thoughtful decisionmakers should use good
proxies that aim at the right targets, both benefits and burdens.
From agency experience with statistical life valuation, the
obvious replacements for respondent hourly wages are surveys on
WTP to avoid time-related burdens (or WTA to take up those
burdens) and market behavior with respect to comparable time

209.
210.
211.
212.

See supra text accompanying notes 191–93.
See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
See Jonathan Alter, Failure to Launch: How Obama Fumbled HealthCare.gov, 93
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 39, 39–40 (2014).
213. For a survey indicating the impact of wait times on the chance that a WIC participant
will not pick up a food voucher, see Mary Lou Woelfel et al., Barriers to the Use of WIC
Services, 104 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 736, 742 (2004). See also Kevin M. Roy, Carolyn Y. Tubbs
& Linda M. Burton, Don’t Have No Time: Daily Rhythms and the Organization of Time for
Low-Income Families, 53 FAM. REL. 168, 172 (2004); Debra Thingstad Boe, William Riley &
Helen Parsons, Improving Service Delivery in a County Health Department WIC Clinic, 99 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 1619, 1623 (2009) (correlating shorter clinic lobby waiting time with higher
client satisfaction, and stating that “clients have difficulty distinguishing between the quality of a
service and the quality of the process used to deliver the service”).
214. See Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea. The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k)
Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1149, 1159–61 (2001) (finding significant
enrollment differences between a form requiring opt-in and a form requiring opt-out).
215. For a terrific contribution to our understanding of how law in the United States helps
structure the use of people’s time, with attention to long-term legal trends and a focus on
coordination and contrasting uses, see TODD RAKOFF, A TIME FOR EVERY PURPOSE 157
(2002).
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216

burdens. Over a decade ago, IRS commissioned a review of time
217
valuation options that included subjective valuation surveys, and
218
scholarship on such instruments continues. Decisions must be made
regarding how to frame questions and how narrowly to target surveys;
not every paperwork or line-waiting experience is valued the same
and yet government should not finance annual surveys on every
experience. But these decisions can be made well enough to beat
reliance on hourly wages. IRS has already asked a random sample of
taxpayers a related question: “[H]ow comfortable did you feel
219
completing your 2010 federal tax return?”
Additionally, there are many live markets for government
paperwork and similar time burdens, where law allows for
220
offloading. A salient example is tax preparation, but many other
time burdens are offloaded to data entry clerks, accountants, and
221
lawyers. There even is a market for waiting in line.
Linestanding.com, a service based in Washington, D.C., charges $36
per hour to have someone wait in line for you, albeit with a two-hour
222
minimum. Of course these prices do not represent the full value to
especially pleased customers, and market prices indicate at best an
upper bound on the monetary valuation by people who stand in line
for themselves. Nonetheless, these indications are superior to
unsubstantiated guesses.

216. Or, more creatively, analysis of market data to infer wage premiums for low-paperwork
jobs.
217. See Guyton et al., supra note 114, at 676 n.4; Cameron, supra note 205, at 16–20, 29–35.
218. With impressively specific niches. See, e.g., John Calfee & Clifford Winston, The Value
of Automobile Travel Time: Implications for Congestion Policy, 69 J. PUB. ECON. 83, 91–93
(1998) (reporting WTP for reduced congested travel time of only 19 percent of hourly wages
among those who are already driving, and contrasting choice-of-transit mode studies indicating
WTP to reduce commute time of 50–100 percent of hourly wages); Andrew Daly, Flavia Tsang
& Charlene Rohr, The Value of Small Time Savings for Non-Business Travel, 48 J. TRANSPORT
ECON. & POL’Y 205, 215 (2014) (concluding that travel-time surveys show nonlinear valuations
and greater sensitivity to time losses than gains, from some reference point).
219. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 35, at 16 (providing boxes to
check off for very comfortable, comfortable, somewhat comfortable, or not comfortable).
220. “Must DIY” laws include jury duty, compulsory education for children, military
conscription in the twentieth century, and continuing legal education for practicing lawyers
today.
221. See Libby Copeland, The Line Starts Here: For Some, Waiting Is a Profession that
Doesn’t Involve Tables, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2005, at C1.
222. See Josh Spiro, When Billions Are on the Line, So Are They, INC.COM (2010), http://
www.inc.com/articles/2010/03/linestanding-on-capital-hill.html [http://perma.cc/LQV8-DENV].
Employees were paid $12–$16 per hour in 2010. Id.
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Furthermore, surveys and markets can reflect major and subtle
differences across time-related burdens in a way that a flat measure in
hours cannot. Think about all of the activities associated with
obtaining WIC benefits, including filling out forms, getting blood
drawn, traveling to a service center, waiting in line, and discussing
nutrition with a health professional. There is no principled reason to
treat all of these experiences as burdensome in exactly the same way.
Part of the explanation for DIY line-standing (when contracting out is
lawful) is the ability to multitask, which has become easier with
223
portable electronic devices and telecommunications networks, and
which differs from the cognitively loaded experience of filling out
forms or the distinct physical experience of getting blood drawn.
Agency practices under the Paperwork Reduction Act might sidestep
the wide variety of human experiences that can be counted as timerelated burdens, but a scaled-up effort at thoughtful policy analysis
will not. In this context, time is not money; time is a vast array of
experience with more than one price.
To see the need for focused research and unique judgments,
consider the building evidence on how people react when their time is
at stake. Objective clock time, which is what agencies count today, is
different from subjective time, which can depend on the quality of the
experience. Felt time loss might be minimized by pleasant ambience,
welcome outcomes, even caffeine—or, perhaps perversely, by making
224
time-related burdens more complex. Studies also indicate that the

223. See Dorien Morin-Van Dam, 20/20 Tasks: Smartphone Productivity While You Wait,
ATLANTIC WEBWORKS (July 9, 2014), http://www.atlanticwebworks.com/blog/smartphoneproductivity-wait [http://perma.cc/U3LB-9AAR]; see generally Pedro Cardoso-Leite, C. Shawn
Green & Daphne Bavelier, On the Impact of New Technologies on Multitasking, 35
DEVELOPMENTAL REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 2, 11), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.
2014.12.005 [http://perma.cc/L4VU-RNMA].
224. See Michaelle Ann Cameron, Julie Baker, Mark Peterson & Karin Braunsberger, The
Effects of Music, Wait-Length Evaluation, and Mood on a Low-Cost Wait Experience, 56 J. BUS.
RES. 421, 428 (2003) (noting evidence of music reducing perceived wait time, but emphasizing
the mediating influence of mood); Barbara Fasolo, Floriana A. Carmeci & Raffaella Misuraca,
The Effect of Choice Complexity on Perception of Time Spent Choosing, 26 J. PSYCHOL. &
MARKETING 213, 219–20 (2009) (finding that complexity reduces perceived duration in
experiments on the choice of one out of six mobile phones (overestimation) as opposed to one
out of twenty-four mobile phones (underestimation)); see also David S. Ackerman & Barbara L.
Gross, So Many Choices, So Little Time, 30 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 290, 293 (2003)
(indicating that having many choices for discretionary activities can lead to feelings of time
pressure, time deprivation, and a perceived shortage of free time).
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felt pace of time depends on several variables beyond age, such as
226
urbanization and a sense of entitlement. Studies like these generate
insight and hard questions. Hours alone fail to reflect the
aforementioned nuances, yet unswerving reliance on subjective
valuation seems normatively obtuse. Should government work harder
to reduce time burdens for those who suffer more per hour simply
because they have a strong sense of entitlement to a hassle-free
existence? This question would be especially pointed if society ends
up with more self-important types when those people are rewarded
227
with less paperwork and shorter lines.
At some point, moreover, CBA proponents should account for
beneficial effects of time burdens, such as rationing benefits and
screening beneficiaries when reliable information is otherwise scarce.
For example, willingness to spend time in line might reveal a level of
need and lack of market opportunity that is difficult for outsiders to
228
discover in other ways. As well, requiring people to fill out forms
might focus their attention on important issues that usually are
229
ignored. In a similar vein, some empirical studies indicate that
people are less likely to chase after sunk costs across time frames
230
when the costs come in time as opposed to money. This may show
225. See Marc Wittmann & Sandra Lehnhoff, Age Effects in Perception of Time, 97
PSYCHOL. REPS. 921, 926–27, 931 (2005) (finding a modest effect of age on likelihood of
reporting that time passed quickly during the last ten years).
226. See Edward H. O’Brien, Phyllis A. Anastasio & Brad J. Bushman, Time Crawls When
You’re Not Having Fun: Feeling Entitled Makes Dull Tasks Drag On, 37 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. BULL. 1287, 1287 (2011) (studying sense of entitlement and indicating effects on
perceived pace of time from exhaustion, social rejection, alcohol, caffeine, city life, and body
temperature). The last four factors on the list seem to speed up subjective time.
227. See James A. Danckert & Ava-Ann A. Allman, Time Flies When You’re Having Fun:
Temporal Estimation and the Experience of Boredom, 59 BRAIN & COGNITION 236, 240–42
(2005); John D. Watt, Effect of Boredom Proneness on Time Perception, 69 PSYCHOL. REPS.
323, 324–25 (1991) (involving undergraduates circling a bunch of numbers, and correlating
boredom proneness with slower perceived pace of time but not less accurate estimates of clock
time). I think of this as a kind of (dis)utility monster problem, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 41 (1974), plus a worry about incentives.
228. Cf. Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
687, 717 (2010) (illustrating how administrative processing costs can help screen out low-value
applications where information problems hinder accurate evaluation of each applicant); Ronen
Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, Queues in Law, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1595, 1630 (2014) (discussing ticket
sales under a first-come, first-served rule with no scalping).
229. See Samaha & Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 962.
230. See Robin L. Soster, Ashwani Monga & William O. Bearden., Tracking Costs of Time
and Money: How Accounting Periods Affect Mental Accounting, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 712,
716–17 (Dec. 2010) (recognizing this phenomena with the rate at which free or discounted
movie tickets were picked up during a later time frame); cf. Yu-Tse Lin & Lien-Ti Bei, The
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greater rationality in dealing with time losses, which might
recommend time burdens over monetary costs when policymakers
have the choice. Furthermore, people might be better able to
retrospectively reevaluate the quality of past experiences, including
231
time burdens, compared to monetary losses. Adaptation can be a
source of strength and averted welfare losses, not only troubling
adaptive preferences.
These are benefits worth investigating, all consistent with an
inclusive cost-benefit analysis, not a reason to stop thinking hard
about quantifying and monetizing time burdens. And the challenges
are similar, if not tougher, for monetizing the value of statistical life.
Willingness-to-pay instruments are practical tools for gaining insight,
never perfect, into how people themselves value experiences, and for
adding this one important factor to a thoughtful decision procedure.
This is no trivial matter.
b. Organizations and contracting out.
Organizations and
offloaded paperwork do present special issues, however. Many
government paperwork burdens are directly imposed not on
individuals but on organizations. These organizations are legal
constructs and we might conclude that organizations per se do not
232
“suffer” paperwork burdens.
Corporations, charities, state
governments, and the like employ people in-house, contract out, or
get volunteers to do the paperwork (and everything else).
Government paperwork burdens can be evaluated like other
regulatory impositions on an organization, such as adding a scrubber
Perceived Value of Time in a Transaction, 35 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 720, 720 (2008)
(concluding that prospect theory does apply to wait time, although expected wait time is the
reference point for loss aversion). For especially nuanced findings, see France Leclerc, Bernd H.
Schmitt & Laurette Dubé, Waiting Time and Decision Making: Is Time Like Money?, 22 J.
CONSUMER RES. 110, 111–12, 116–19 (1995) (claiming that, unlike the attractiveness of gambles
to avoid money losses, people are risk averse or risk neutral toward gambles to avoid wait time;
but like money, people’s marginal value of a unit of time is higher during shorter overall waits,
and higher when waiting to get a high-priced good or service).
231. See Erica Mina Okada & Stephen J. Hoch, Spending Time Versus Spending Money, 31
J. CONSUMER RES. 313, 321–22 (2004) (arguing time and money are types of currency, but that
time’s opportunity cost is ambiguous and easier to reevaluate).
232. This position has become somewhat controversial. Consider the federal government’s
opt-out procedure for religious nonprofits that oppose contraception coverage, see 45 C.F.R.
§ 147.131(b) (2014), and the religious objections thereto, see Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S.
Ct. 2806, 2809 (2014) (per curiam) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining that the exemption
form asks whether the organization is religiously opposed and requires the organization to send
a copy to the relevant health insurer); Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547, 553 (7th
Cir. 2014).
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to a smokestack: investigate how the organization will comply without
measuring the feelings of people hired for the job.
Agencies calculating paperwork burdens for organizations seem
233
to adopt this market-oriented approach. If organizations will do the
paperwork in-house, agencies likely will monetize burden hours using
approximate wage rates for the employees; if instead organizations
will contract out, agencies likely will use the approximate market rate
for the service. Similarly, to the extent that individual taxpayers hire
tax preparers, IRS counts the out-of-pocket cost without inquiring
234
into the feelings of the taxpayer or preparers.
The logic here seems straightforward and distinctive. When
individuals or organizations hire people to do government
paperwork, the market price is the actual cost of doing the
paperwork, and a hypothetical WTP seems beside the point for
standard cost-benefit analysis from a welfarist perspective. Those
235
costs are experienced in dollars, not time.
This does not eliminate objections to the use of hourly wages
instead of or as a proxy for WTP in other situations, though. Many
people do their own paperwork and line-waiting—either because
DIY is their least-bad alternative or because a “Must DIY” law
essentially requires their personal participation. Whether one calls
the time burden “voluntary” offers no argument for toggling between
hourly wages and WTP. If you want a regulation imposed or an
exemption applied or a gratuity delivered, and if you care at all about
the actual experiences of those you are trying to regulate or exempt
or pay—or even stop from being paid—then you need sound
measures for those experiences that result from your preferred policy.
Sometimes those experiences arrive in the form of time-demanding
activities rather than pocketbook-hitting payments. As things stand,
the federal government sometimes counts these personally
experienced time burdens only in hours (individual tax forms and
student aid applications, for instance), and often converts them into

233. A tipoff is when an agency uses a loaded wage rate. See supra note 106. Those figures
are intended to measure economic costs to the employer that needs the paperwork done, not to
the people who are paid to do the paperwork.
234. See Proposed Collection; Comment Request for Form 1040, 79 Fed. Reg. 24,498,
24,498–99 tbls.1–2 (Apr. 30, 2014).
235. I am ignoring lingering hard feelings or satisfaction with offloading paperwork, or
wage-uncompensated joy that hired paper-pushers receive from their work. We might still
wonder about the social cost of having an industry devoted to preparing tax forms, including any
resulting political influence in favor of paperwork burdens, but that raises separate questions.
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dollars using an hourly wage (WIC applications and Medicaid
reimbursement forms, for instance). These practices remain in need
of, and probably lack, a good defense.
3. Equality. Finally, agency use of hourly wages is open to
serious criticism quite aside from orthodox principles of social
welfarism and cost-benefit analysis. Egalitarian theories should fuel
concerns about individuated and disparate values for people’s time.
The magnitude, not the presence, of these concerns depends on how
236
the egalitarian commitment is elaborated. One might aim to
237
or
(partially) equalize individual well-being, for example,
238
or resources that seem
opportunities to achieve well-being,
239
objectively good. As well, these theories may apply differently to
different time burdens depending on whether one views the given
burden as a universal civic duty. But whichever member of the
egalitarian family of theories is applied, market wages are troubling
metrics for valuing people’s time.
a. More problems with market wages. Making paperwork policy
sensitive to hourly wages helps achieve economic productivity
without clearly advancing any standard version of egalitarianism. We
all know that people in the United States are paid vastly different
amounts of money in hourly terms for the work that they do, which is
understandable in a society that values economically efficient
resource allocation. Importing this wage disparity into government’s
time burden estimates should jar egalitarians, however.
Cashing out time burdens with hourly wages suggests that the
time needed to perform similar tasks should receive very different
levels of government concern depending on the class of wage earners
facing the burden. The imputed minimum wage for WIC mothers
seeking nutritional assistance is less than one tenth of the hourly wage
240
estimate for doctors completing reimbursement forms. If such
236. See generally SAMUEL FLEISCHACKER, A SHORT HISTORY OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
9–10 (2004).
237. See LARRY S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY 118–53 (1993) (listing options for measuring
welfare inequality).
238. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 73 (2000) (distinguishing “brute
luck” from “option luck” following a person’s deliberate gamble); Anne L. Alstott, Equal
Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV. 470, 478–84 (2007) (illustrating
divisions within resource egalitarian theory).
239. See supra note 163 (collecting sources).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 121–22.
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money values are taken seriously, officials will exert far greater effort
to free up high-wage earners’ lives compared to low-wage earners’
lives. Ten times as much monetized burden suggests ten times as
much benefit from relieving the same paperwork obligation. It is
difficult to see how agency time valuations based on unadjusted
market wages could be anything but unhelpful in achieving greater
equality of well-being, opportunity for well-being, or objective goods.
The federal government takes a different position on valuing
risks to people’s lives, with one feature more friendly to egalitarian
commitments. The value of a statistical life is the same for all people
241
within each proposed agency rule, “for policy reasons.” Agencies
have resisted suggestions that different VSLs be assigned to different
classes of regulatory beneficiaries, to the extent that different classes
evince different WTP for risk reductions. Leading agencies’ VSLs do
not distinguish among racial categories, younger and older people,
242
men and women, or rich and poor people. It is true that different
agencies may adopt different VSLs and the same agency may change
its VSL over time, but the practice has been to find a single dollar
value for life-saving risk reductions to be used for all predicted
beneficiaries of a given regulation.
Whatever one’s tolerance for individuating costs and benefits,
there should be serious doubt that life and time can be distinguished.
Egalitarian objections can be equally piercing either way. In the case
of life, different valuations for different people would mean that the
same mortality risk would be worth more government effort to
eliminate for select classes of people. A determined egalitarian easily
could say that this approach violates commitments to treat people
with equal regard, while a simple welfare maximizer could respond
that the approach is the proper result of honoring individual’s
peculiar preferences. The key point is that each side could make the
same claims with regard to government decisions that prompt people
to use a segment of their lives in one way rather than another.
True, we can wonder whether individuated valuations will add
up to a universal average if aggregated and whether, therefore, the
stakes of the choice are low for overall regulatory results. The
differences might wash out if we evaluate the regulatory state as a

241. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 9.
242. See id.; REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 171, at 83.
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243

whole. However, significant distributional effects will persist for the
minimization of time burdens. In the past, federal law has set goals
for paperwork burden reduction in percentage terms; more recently,
agencies and OIRA have totaled up paperwork burdens and looked
244
for major paperwork reductions. If the time burden is monetized
instead of left in hours, agencies can more easily drive down the
monetized burden by focusing on high-dollar targets.
Perhaps this disparity would be reduced if agencies shifted to
WTP or another proxy for how people value their own time doing
245
paperwork, given the opportunity costs. These subjective valuations
might not vary as much as wages. But as with valuing statistical lives,
easily ascertainable classes of people might differ substantially in how
they value different experiences. Some of those differences likely will
track lines of age, race, sex, and wealth. Not much hope exists for the
convergence of egalitarian commitments and the standard
measurement techniques for social welfare. In any event, the results
for egalitarians seem at least as bad if government values time with
hourly wages.
b. Hours and their complications. All of this might suggest a very
different direction for egalitarians on government valuation of time:
leaving dollars behind and embracing hours alone. Paperwork
burdens quantified in hours might have an attractive, even beautiful
quality for egalitarians. Considering only hours treats everyone’s time
equally in a deep sense. In addition, agencies will face
commensurability issues regardless. For many information
collections, the benefits will be difficult to monetize or even quantify.
Think about the decennial census, which is constitutionally mandated
246
in some form. What is the beneficial value of conducting the census,
exactly, in dollars? Analogous markets exist for only some of the
information and purposes served by the census—not, for instance,
apportioning seats in the House of Representatives—and we might
wonder whether policymakers should be estimating the monetary

243. Cf. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 171, at 83–84 (arguing that “a cost-benefit
analysis using an average value of a statistical life is unmoored from its economic justification,”
but raising moral objections and indicating that roughly efficient regulation can result in
aggregate).
244. See supra notes 26–27, 63 and accompanying text; see also LAVE, supra note 190, at 19–
20 (regarding CBA).
245. See supra Part III.B.1–2.
246. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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value of constitutional fidelity. Less stark quantification issues
accompany many other information collection contexts, including the
value of the income tax system and nutrition education for pregnant
women. Moreover, hours remain a focus of the administrative state.
OIRA’s paperwork budget for the United States counts hours, not
dollars, and President Obama’s recent directive on new paperwork
reduction ideas set goals in hours, not dollars. Counting hours is
247
something of a tradition.
But the tradition does not so easily align with egalitarian goals.
An hours-only policy first faces the problem of treating all time
burdens alike. Wanting to treat people with equal concern and
respect hardly implies treating every minute of every unwelcome
experience—from completing census forms to blood draws—as
having the same quality. That would flatten human experience
unrealistically. Perhaps this problem can be solved by maintaining
partitioned subcategories of time burdens judged to be similar.
Although the proper egalitarian method for assigning different values
to different human experiences is not immediately apparent, we can
suppose that differentiation of experiences is achievable with enough
thought.
Even so, there remains a lingering problem for an hours-only
policy: operating a sensible and structured evaluation of time burdens
counted, whether using cost-benefit analysis or another protocol. This
problem is old and not at all special to time valuation, which is part of
the point. The challenge attaches to the valuation of paperwork, life
risks, and other effects of government decisions. Someone should be
intelligently evaluating the upsides and downsides of feasible policy
options in a manner conducive to thoughtful comparisons. Paperwork
is not all bad; it can produce useful information flows. But time
burdens can come in infinite forms, always with trade-offs along
multiple dimensions. Agencies regularly must decide how and
248
whether information collections will happen, and those decisions
cannot turn on hourly burdens alone. A statutorily mandated
collection only moves the normative focus to the legislature.
247. See supra note 72 (referencing President Carter’s directive); see also ADLER & POSNER,
supra note 170, at 178–82 (suggesting ways that agencies may be avoiding the welfare effects of
unadjusted WTP numbers, such as by using a single constant VSL or saved life years).
248. See 2014 OIRA REPORT, supra note 2, at iii, 2, 4–5 (counting most burden hours as
discretionary, but stressing factors outside agency control in explaining apparent increases in
paperwork burdens). Even the detailed statutes governing federal income taxes leave some
room for agency judgment over tax forms. See Guyton et al., supra note 114, at 674.

SAMAHA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

342

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

11/2/2015 8:07 PM

[Vol. 65:279
249

Congress’s work is susceptible to a kind of cost-benefit analysis, too.
Even the census is supposed to be taken in a “[m]anner” directed by
250
law, which implies some choice over how, how much, and what kind
of information to gather. These unavoidable choices put the value of
information in one register and hourly burdens in another, with no
apparent way forward to decision.
Nobody should think that monetizing all such effects under CBA
is the simple solution instead of a mere leading candidate for
managing a hard problem. Government paperwork burdens do come
251
in units of time—when not contracted out —but nearly every other
relevant consequence will not. Government paperwork takes time
and money from some people to generate information for various
purposes including extending lives, enhancing the quality of life, and
redistributing wealth. Policymakers face decisions with multiple
projected effects that are most easily counted in dollars, lives, and
other units. Yet dollar costs and benefits are prevalent across all
government initiatives. Agency efforts to monetize risks to life and
life quality are now long-standing, ongoing, and common. In terms of
administrative ease, those efforts count for something. Agencies can
252
translate shortened lives into hours if they have a good baseline, but
translation into hours becomes harder or nonsensical when the
consequence to be valued is a risk to life, life quality, or basically
anything else. Monetizing a larger fraction of policy effects shrinks
the scope of difficult judgment calls, which will not disappear under
253
anyone’s favorite decision procedure. For some policy decisions,

249. The Paperwork Reduction Act itself directs OMB to estimate paperwork burdens for
proposed legislation. See 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1)(C) (2012). Frustration with Congress as an
unheralded source of paperwork burden, and as an institution that escapes thoughtful CBA, is
obviously not a strong reason to thwart better practices at OIRA and other agencies. At most,
one might think that delegating to agencies will improve policy on time burdens. But this Article
is only modest support for that hope.
250. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
251. The correct egalitarian response to these markets is unclear to me. One could direct
agencies to ignore the market prices that some people actually pay; or instead favor must-DIY
paperwork requirements, making them like jury duty. Cf. SANDEL, supra note 173, at 39
(suggesting the “egalitarian appeal” of first-come, first-served queuing without market-based
line cutting); Perry & Zarsky, supra note 228, at 1598 (collecting justifications for queuing).
Strategies such as these can help salvage a policy of valuing everyone’s time equally, although
those strategies will raise objections to this kind of egalitarianism itself.
252. See supra Part II.A.
253. In this spirit are Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV.
1369, 1387–91 (2014) (elaborating “breakeven analysis” whereby agencies facing trade-offs and
a mix of quantified and unquantified effects isolate the uncertainty and identify conditions on
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monetizing time will be the only remaining step to full
commensurability.
Finally, egalitarian victories are not foreshadowed by agencies
counting only hours. One must know how agency officials actually use
dollar estimates in evaluating policy options, compared to situations
in which only hourly totals are available—empirical issues about
which we know little at the moment. As with monetization concerns
generally, we certainly may hypothesize that, at least under certain
conditions, dollar figures will have a special weight in official
254
decisions that mere numbers and unquantified values lack. Just as
certainly, however, we may hypothesize that, under other conditions,
poignant expositions of consequences in terms of human dignity,
equity, and other nonmonetized values will outweigh the upshot of
255
any mathematical expression. Preserving incommensurate factors in
policy analysis might enhance agency discretion, but it is no guarantee
that officials will pursue egalitarian missions. At the same time,
assuring incommensurability is some guarantee that social-welfare
effects cannot be assessed sensibly.
In the end, the choice is not really between monetization and
equality. Hours can be monetized without forfeiting egalitarian goals.
For instance, the exact same dollar value can be assigned to
everyone’s time, if that is somehow the best specification of
egalitarian commitments. An accessible number is the national
average hourly wage, although no universal value can be assigned
without making controversial normative choices. Other equalitywhich benefits would exceed costs), and Arden Rowell, Partial Valuation in Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 723, 724 (2012) (contending that a commensurability problem may
leave room for a partial monetary valuation for CBA purposes).
254. Cf. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 194, at 1578 (“[T]he specific dollar values
kicked out by cost-benefit analysis tend to obscure these underlying issues [about how to value
human life] . . . .”); id. at 1579 (asserting that “[t]he non-quantitative aspects of [EPA’s] analyses
are almost invariably ignored in public discussions of its policies”). For intriguing studies on
how priming images of money and references to money-related concepts can influence the
reported preferences of ordinary people for markets and social inequality, see Eugene M.
Caruso, Kathleen D. Vohs, Brittani Baxter & Adam Waytz, Mere Exposure to Money Increases
Endorsement of Free-Market Systems and Social Inequality, 142 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 301,
302–05 (2013). It remains to be seen whether these studies are indicative of how officials behave
when they are instructed to use cost-benefit analysis with unquantified or nonmonetized
consequences.
255. On the emerging use of values such as human dignity under governing executive order,
see Sunstein, supra note 253, at 1371, 1380 (discussing, in part, an agency analysis that used
nonmonetized values to justify a rearview camera rule for automobiles that would otherwise
flunk CBA). The decisionmaker’s preferences might be much more influential than the metrics
used to describe consequences.
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related goals can fit with monetized time as well. Thus, if egalitarian
theory turns out to demand that government value disadvantaged
people’s time even more than other people’s time—instead of or in
addition to other forms of redistribution—this, too, can be
accomplished in dollar terms. For instance, officials could begin with
the national average hourly wage as the starting point for
monetization, and then make adjustments for wealthier classes of
affected individuals according to some measure of diminishing
marginal value for money. In any case, egalitarian concerns with
individuated pricing of people’s time seem similar to individuated
pricing of statistical lives, and the solutions are not obviously
different.
CONCLUSION
Sensibly valuing people’s time is hard, not easy, and
government’s valuations are usually implicit or mysterious. No public
official is reporting how government valued people’s time standing in
line at polling places when the election system was designed. No
agency is busy counting up what people gain and lose from jury duty.
Officials actually trying to achieve a lawful, principled, administrable,
transparent, and politically sustainable method of valuation deserve
thanks. But today the federal government counts hours for only a
slice of time-related burdens, often but not always converts those
hours into dollars, and, when it does, uses a large spectrum of hourly
wages. No effort has been made to reconcile any of this with the
valuation of reduced life risks.
Both welfarists and egalitarians should have foundational
objections to current agency practices. A straightforward reform for
welfarists is to gather information on people’s willingness to pay to
avoid important time-related burdens, similar to what agencies
already do for life risks. Although the way forward for egalitarians
might be less clear, they should consider universal dollar values for
various categories of time burdens. There remains ample room for
debate over specific reform proposals. What should be clear enough
now is that respect-worthy governments respect people’s lives and
their time—which are in part the same good—and that we can give
better answers to the valuation questions embedded in those
aspirations.

